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I. General
Unanimous passage of the National Cooperative Research Act
of 1984 (NCRA)1 aimed at stimulating "innovative research and de-
velopment by the private sector" to "enable American business and
industry to keep pace with foreign competitors in a world increas-
ingly dependent on technological innovation."'2 Thus, for the second
time in two years,3 Congress undertook the role of pan-industrial
psychologist in response to nothing more than perceptions that the
1. Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305
(Supp. 11 1984)) [hereinafter NCRA].
2. Statement of J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General (Antitrust), 49 Fed.
Reg. 50,121 at 50,122 (1984).
3. See Titles III & IV of The Export Trading Company Act of 1982. Pub.L. No. 97-
290, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982) [hereinafter ETCA].
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"antitrust laws" discouraged a form of commercial activity in a way
prejudicial to successful American participation in international
trade." The 1984 legislation, accompanied by rhetoric that sounded
at least akin to protectionism, aimed at encouraging interestingly de-
fined joint research and development ventures. Whether or not the
Act's objectives will be achieved is impossible to predict. However, it
is all too easy to observe that benefits of NCRA neither are limited
to American enterprise nor are ignored by foreigners. Non-American
firms are prominent among those enterprises known to be taking ad-
vantage of NCRA.5 With this, the writers are not necessarily un-
sympathetic but they note that the benefits of NCRA for foreigners
are not keyed to reciprocity for American firms being afforded by
their base nations.
A. Modification of "Antitrust Law"
It is more than possible to say that NCRA modified application
of federal and various state "antitrust laws" in ways unheralded by
popular reports contemporaneous with enactment and immediately
subsequent commentaries.6 What benefits are accorded those affili-
4. ETCA responded to "perceptions" that potential for antitrust prosecutions
prejudiced various export initiatives. H.R. REP. No. 637(11), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted
in 1982 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2444, 2446; H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,
4, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2487, 2489. See generally, D. UN-
KOVIC, J. MAHER & N. LAMONT, INTERNATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES AND THE EXPORT TRAD-
ING COMPANY ACT OF 1982, (BNA) (1984).
Passing NCRA, Congress desired to eliminate "any misconception" that the antitrust
laws impeded formation of joint research and development ventures. H.R. CONF. REP. No.
1044, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 8-9 reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMUN. NEWS 3133.
Successive Assistant Attorneys General for Antitrust had testified concerning perceptions that
antitrust impeded joint R&D efforts. Prof. W. F. Baxter is quoted in H.R. REP. No. 656, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. at 11-12 and his successor, J. Paul McGrath, in S. REP. No. 427, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3107.
5. See, e.g. Mercedes Benz and Volvo affiliates are "members" of the Engine Manu-
facturers Association, 53 Fed. Reg. 12202 (1988); each of the Japanese firms known as Fujtsu
Ltd., NEC Corporation and Sumitomo Electric Industries Ltd. seemingly has independently
joint ventured with Bell Communications Research, Inc., 52 Fed. Reg. 4670 (1987), 53 Fed.
Reg. 5059 (Feb. 2, 1988) and 53 Fed. Reg. 11352 (1988), which itself is a joint venture
principally composed of the divested "Baby Bells", 50 Fed. Reg. 4280 (1985); North Ameri-
can Phillips, Bell Canada, Hydro Quebec and Ontario Hydro are part of a NAHB Research
Foundation project, 53 Fed. Reg. 9154 (1988); numerous European and Japanese enterprises
including NEC are involved in Computer Aided Manufacturing-International, 53 Fed. Reg.
4232 (1988); and, Nippon Telegraph & Telephone is involved in joint research with Corning
Glass Works, 52 Fed. Reg. 28494 (1987). European and Japanese companies were among the
earliest beneficiaries of an NCRA filing, 50 Fed. Reg. 3425 (1985).
6. See, e.g., a report that NCRA's subjection of joint research and development ven-
tures to "the rule of reason . . . seems declaratory of pre-existing law." Areeda, Antitrust
Analysis T 367 (1986 Supp. to 3d ed.). This ignores that NCRA's particularized rule of reason
is applicable to consideration of joint ventures, and venturers' activities in furtherance thereof,
in prosecutions under not only § I of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1984), but also many
laws (including the "unfair methods of competition" jurisdiction of the F.T.C.) comprehended
by "antitrust laws" as defined at 15 U.S.C. § 4301 (1984) and "similar" state laws as impli-
cated by 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (1984). By definition, rule of reason analyses are foreign to many
of the affected federal and state statutes. See infra text accompanying notes 158-239.
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ated in defined cooperation? Deferring to organization of the statute,
the benefits differ in nature and quality. One inures to any associa-
tion falling within the definition of "joint research and development
venture"' whereas two others are contingent upon filing of minimal
data disclosures with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 8
Assuming that an alliance falls within the definition, a "rule of
reason" more charitable than Brandeis' classic formulation is appro-
priate to judicial consideration of its activities under not only section
1 of the Sherman Act - with which the feared per se characteriza-
tion abbreviating rule of reason analysis usually is associated - but
also antitrust statutes to which the classic is alien.9 This occurs with-
out need for a filing with DOJ and FTC. Accomplishing such a fil-
ing is a condition for achieving (a) limiting defined venturers' expo-
sures in law suits to actual rather treble or punitive damages1" and
(b) putting plaintiffs at risk of being held to pay successful defend-
ants' attorneys' fees.11 Consequently, the numbers and identities of
enterprises comprehended by NCRA filings with DOJ and FTC do
not necessarily exhaust the catalogue of those entitled to benefit of
the Act's own rule of reason.
B. Congressional Irony?
Congress sometimes displays a genius for disinformative or
ironic entitling of legislative acts." Quite apart from NCRA's often
curious substantive and procedural provisions, its name provides not
For other perspectives, see MCINERNEY, Antitrust Scrutiny of Joint Research and Devel-
opment Venture in the U.S. and the EEC, 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 355 (B. Hawk ed.
1987); Miller, Contractual Joint Ventures between Parties with Complementary Research
Programs, 68 PATENT & TRADEMARK J. 48 (1986); Holmes, Research Joint Ventures and the
Antitrust Laws - Recent Statutory and Administrative Changes, 66 CHICAGO BAR RECORD
252 (1985); Wright, The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984: A New Antitrust Re-
gime for Joint Research and Development Ventures, I HIGH TECHNOLOGY L.J. 133 (1986);
Note, Giving the Patent Owner His Due: Recent Developments in the Antitrust/Patent Misuse
Interface, 12 DEL. J. OF CORP. L. 135 (1987).
7. NCRA § 2(a)(6) & 3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301(a)(6), 4302 (1984).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 256-292.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 158-239.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 4303 (1983).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 4304 (1984).
12. Of ETCA's substantive provisions, only the addresses to commercial banking in the
Act's Title I1 are concerned with international trading companies denominated as "export
trading companies" (12 U.S.C. §§ 635a-4, 1843(c)(14), and 372(7) (1984)) whereas the ad-
dresses of ETCA Titles III & IV to antitrust (15 U.S.C. §§ 7, 45(a)(3), and 4011-21 (1984))
have no relevance peculiar to export trading companies as defined elesewhere in the Act. This
tends to confuse the unwary. Thus, a 1985 casebook would have students believe that the
benefits of Certificates of Review (CORs) under ETCA Title III (15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-21
(1982)) are limited to enterprises organized as export trading companies (ETCs). Ironically,
consider the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94
Stat. 374 (1980), which constrained FTC in various particulars.
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only an example of such disinformation but a clue that there is a
dramatic difference between what the Act says and that which its
proponents urged on an overt level. Looking only to NCRA's title,
use of the word "national" is somewhat mysterious ab initio. "Na-
tional" signifies neither that NCRA encourages only domestic "co-
operative research" nor that benefitted cooperators need be Ameri-
can nor that benefits of such research will be peculiar to American
enterprises nor that there will be value to the American economy as
distinguished from a world economy. This is true despite the facts
that NCRA's legislative history makes it clear that Congress' pur-
pose,13 in which the executive shared,14 was to incentivize coopera-
tive technological research among American firms and thereby to
improve their competency to participate effectively in international
competition. That it is possible to gear such statutory incentives to
firms at least formally American was demonstrated only two years
before NCRA when Congress adopted Title III of the Export Trad-
ing Company Act (ETCA)' 5 in quite another promotional context
but one also generated by mere perceptions that antitrust norms
prejudiced exports. 6
In 1984, Congress aimed to incentivize collaborative research
and development (R&D) efforts by eliminating or, at least, minimiz-
ing American firms' alleged "misperception" that antitrust uncer-
tainties militated against joint research and development ventures."
If the benefits of NCRA are not limited to American firms, what is
the significance of "national"? To answer this, it is necessary to look
to what Congress afforded in order to dispel inhibitions presumably
induced by generalized misconceptions and to remark various
anamolies implicit in the therapies.
13. See H.R. REP. No. 571(l), 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-13 (1983); H.R. REP. No. 656,
98th Cong. 2d Sess., 7-10; S. Rep. No. 427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-4 reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3105-3108.
14. See Statement by the President proposing a "National Productivity & Innovation
Act of 1983" (Sept. 12, 1983) and Presidential Message of Sept. 12, 1983 to Congress trans-
mitting the text of what became HR. REP. No. 3878, reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
No. 14(11) (Sept. 19, 1963).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 4021(5) (1982). More subtle were ETCA Title IV's direct amend-
ments of the Sherman Act and Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) 'to the ultimate effect
that greatly enhanced jurisdictional thresholds operate to favor U.S. exporters to the degree
their anticompetitive conduct avoids prejudicing domestic or export commerce. 15 U.S.C. §§
6a & 45(a)(3) (1982).
16. H.R. REP. No. 637(11), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 2444, 2446; H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 4 reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2487, 2489.
17. Noting inter alia testimony of J. Paul McGrath, the Assistant Attorney General
for Antitrust, that there was a "misperception" that antitrust laws constituted a barrier to
joint R&D, the Senate Judiciary Committee opined that, "[t]o rectify this perception problem,
this bill provides explicit congressional recognition of the fact that joint R&D activity will
generally encourage competition, and that such competition should not be inhibited by unclear
antitrust standards". S. REP. No. 427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3107.
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Principal therapies deployed by NCRA are (i) insulation of the
conduct of persons "making or performing a contract to carry out"
collective research and development (R&D) activities"8 from charac-
terization as offensive per se to not only federal and state "antitrust
laws" (defined to include §5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act (FTCA) only to the extent it proscribes "unfair methods of
competition"); 19 (ii) committing of prosecutions. under all such "anti-
trust laws" to rule of reason analyses (even though various of the
affected statutes prohibit conduct without necessary reference to an-
ticompetitive purpose or effect) channeled to mandate assessing par-
ticularized effects on competition in R&D markets inter alia;20 and,
(iii) conditional limitation of certain R&D joint venturers' exposure
to private suitors, under §§ 4 and 4C of the Clayton Act as well as
particularized state laws, to actual damages (sometimes inaccurately
referred to as "detrebling"). 2 Since each principal NCRA therapy
preemptively addresses state as well as federal laws, the Act enunci-
ates national policy. Only these preemptions warrant use of "na-
tional" to describe the Act.
Similarly, the words "cooperative research" say both too much
and too little. Much more than collaborative research is encouraged.
Attention is focused on a liberal definition of R&D which embraces
collective activities from research through "basic engineering", "ex-
perimental production", "testing", prosecution of patents, and licens-
ing.2 In various industries, this is quite an elaboration of R&D as
hitherto used in the colloquial! Incidentally, quite apart from its role
as a therapist, Congress also sought to induce some paranoia in pri-
vate parties who might sue, under NCRA-defined "antitrust laws"
or their state analogues, by reference to others' conduct of a defined
"joint research and development venture". If plaintiffs lose, they
may be held liable for successful defendants' costs including attor-
neys' fees.2
ETCA, which also modified federal and state "antitrust"
norms"' in the name of dealing with perceptions rather than real-
ity,25 limits benefits of its Certificates of Review (CORs) to enter-
prises at least formally American.2 6 NCRA is remarkable not only
for its failure to confine its benefits to Americans, the principal bene-
ficiaries mentioned by sponsors, but also for going far beyond the
18. 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(b) (1984).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1) (1984).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (1984).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 4303 (1984).
22. See supra note 7.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 4304 (1984).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 4021(6) (1982).
25. See supra note 6.
26. 15 U.S.C. §4021(5) (1982).
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purely technological theme urged by its original sponsorship. 7 Al-
though the legislative history demonstrates considerable interest in
physical sciences, the Act's encouragement is not so limited. We are
taught that, when construing a statute, the starting place is the stat-
ute itself.2 Therefore, it is appropriate to put aside NCRA's legisla-
tive history until it is needed to resolve ambiguity.
II. Who And What Does NCRA Aim to Shield?
The starting point, before assessing benefits actually afforded
R&D joint ventures by NCRA and considering techniques appropri-
ate to maximum enjoyment of whatever benefit is afforded, is to con-
sider who Congress benefitted or sought to benefit. To identify such
beneficiaries, it is necessary to consider NCRA's rather lengthy
description of an encouraged joint research and development venture
and then to look to the therapies.
A. Beneficiaries Contemplated by NCRA's Inclusive-Exclusive
Language and Therapies
1. Defining the Term "Joint Research and Development Ven-
ture".-Within §2 of NCRA appears the following:
(a) For purposes of this Act:
(6) The term "joint research and development venture means any
group of activities, including attempting to make, making or per-
forming a contract, by two or more persons for the purpose of-
(A) theoretical analysis, experimentation, or sys-
tematic study of phenomena or observable facts,
(B) the development or testing of basic engineer-
ing techniques,
(C) the extension of investigative findings or the-
ory of a scientific or technical nature into practical
27. See supra notes 13 and 14. While Congress' conception of R&D for purposes of
NCRA may proceed well beyond the term's colloquial meaning, the therapies are not so broad
as those contemporaneously adopted by the Commission of the European Communities. EEC
Regulation 418/85 of Dec. 19, 1985 constitutes a block exemption from Art. 85(3) of the
Treaty of Rome for certain types of joint R&D ventures. 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 53) 5
(1985). Unlike NCRA, EEC Regulation 418/85 provides that various joint R&D ventures are
valid if their activities do not include those on a list of proscriptions but permits parties to
apply for explicit clearance if proposed restrictions are not explicitly approved or disapproved
within the Regulation. Such clearances are promised no later than six months after applica-
tion. The first issued on May 29, 1985, the Regulation having become effective on March 1st.
See 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 80 (July 1I, 1985).
28. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) concerning § 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982)).
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application for experimental and demonstration
purposes, including the experimental production
and testing of models, prototypes, equipment,
materials and processes,
(D) the collection, exchange, and analysis of re-
search information, or
(E) any combination of the purposes specified in
subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and, (D),
and may include the establishment and operation of fa-
cilities for the conducting of research, the conducting of
such venture on a protected and proprietary basis, and
the prosecuting of applications for patents on the grant-
ing of licenses for the results of such venture, but does
not include any activities specified in subsection (b).
(b) the term "joint research and development venture" excludes
the following activities involving two or more persons:
(1) exchanging information among competitors relating
to cost, sales, profitability, prices, marketing, or distri-
bution of any product, process or service that is not rea-
sonably required to conduct the research and develop-
ment that is the purpose of such venture,
(2) entering into any agreement or engaging in any
other conduct restricting, requiring, or otherwise involv-
ing the production or marketing by any person who is a
party to such venture product, process, or service, other
than the production or marketing of proprietary infor-
mation developed through such venture, such as patents
and trade secrets, and
(3) entering into any agreement or engaging in any
other conduct -
(A) to restrict or require the sale, licensing or
sharing of inventions or developments not devel-
oped through such venture, or
(B) to restrict or require participation by such
party in other research and development activities,
that is not reasonably required to prevent misappropria-
tion of proprietary information contributed by any per-
son who is a party to such venture or of the results of
such venture."
Although the Act affords various definitions,30 it does not define
terms such as "phenomena," "observable facts," "basic engineering
techniques," "scientific or technical nature," "models" and
"processes" with which the "purposes" are peppered. On the face of
the matter, it seems that analyses, experimentation and systematic
29. 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(6)&(b) (1984).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 4301 (1984).
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study embraced by the first purpose in NCRA §2(a)(6) are not lim-
ited to physical as opposed to, say, psychological phenomena. From
this it follows that the focus is not limited to the hard sciences and
their applications. Refinements of processes such as Pavlovian condi-
tioning and other aspects of "human engineering" inevitably are in-
cluded - at a minimum - within the overall concept. While it is obvi-
ous that all scientific approaches to observable facts are included, as
are all other species of activities in which use of the word "engineer-
ing" is apropos, these are not all that limiting.
The fourth purpose of § 2(a)(6) is extraordinarily unlimited.
Does not "research information" embrace market studies of not only
consumer preferences but also other factors of minimal if any partic-
ular scientific significance albeit susceptible of scientific collection
and measurement techniques? Where to stop? The sole limit is the
prospect of courts' applications of ejusdem generis to limit "research
information" to things technologic and otherwise scientific in esse
but where is the root? Is any one of the first three purposes limited
to hard as opposed to soft sciences? Cannot economists model and
psychologists engineer and marketers establish prototypes? In any
event, at an essential definitional level, Congress' focus is on persons'
activities when making "or performing" a contract for one or more
purposes surviving the inclusive-exclusive phrasing of NCRA §§
2(a)&(b).
2. The Vehicle Performing the Joint Venture Contract-A
Protected "Person"?.-Various facts of commercial life make it in-
evitable that, while the address of NCRA § 2(a)(6) is to "any group
of activities . . . by two or more persons" oriented to making or per-
forming a contract for definition and implementation of one or more
recognized purposes, performance of such a contract may entail cre-
ation of yet another person or other legal entity3" capable of unilat-
eral day-to-day performance of the venture's business. This includes
conduct of not only analyses, experimentation, studies, reductions of
inventions to practice, filing and prosecution of patent applications,
testing, experimental production, licensing and other tasks explicitly
and implicitly contemplated by the Act "on a protected and proprie-
tary basis""2 but also, presumably, functions such as centralized
planning, budgeting, allocation and reallocation of available human
and material resources, quality control and other aspects of informed
enterprise management. Such functions are neither mentioned nor
excluded by NCRA § 2(a)(6).
Assuming that such an entity is created by two or more per-
31. For example, a business (Massachusetts) trust, corporation or limited partnership
32. 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(6) (1984).
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sons s and that the entity is possessed of centralized management,
are it and its activities entitled to whatever protections NCRA af-
fords? Are its continued existence, and R&D activities within the
scope of § 2(a)(6), also within the ambit of "any group of activities
including . . . performing the" joint venture contract entitled to the
NCRA "rule of reason"?34 To respond negatively would be to say
that NCRA is almost pointless.
Reference to NCRA §3 discloses that Congress did not see fit to
ordain that venturers must operate through the equivalent of a gen-
eral partnership lest they forfeit two of the principal NCRA thera-
pies afforded a defined "joint research and development venture."
NCRA § 3 not only negates application of per se rules but ordains a
"rule of reason standard" for appraisal of "the conduct of any per-
son. . . making or performing a contract to carry out a" joint R&D
venture.35 Thus, assuming proper draftsmanship of both the base
contract contemplating an organized vehicle largely embodying the
venture and the vehicle's articles of incorporation (or limited part-
nership agreement or instrument of trust), the vehicle literally per-
forming the contract is a protected "person" for purposes of NCRA
§3.
Nothing in NCRA § 2(a)(6) precludes formation of such a ve-
hicle to conduct business of the venture. Rather, in order to permit
operation "on a protected and proprietary basis" including unitary
licensing, such a measure seems encouraged on an implicit level.
Surely, prosecuting patent applications and licensing technology on
behalf of a joint venture would be inconvenient without embodying
the venture in a vehicle capable of performing legal acts. Even if the
encouragement is not deemed obvious, it seems that formation of a
jointly-owned R&D vehicle and its subsequent functioning are them-
selves "activities" of the contracting parties within the scope of §
2(a)(6). At a later point," it is suggested that prudent counseling
will see to having a vehicle embodying venture cost and profit centers
become party to the base contract and thereby become one of those
"making" as well as "performing" the contract.
What of the therapy implicit in conditional limitation of private
plaintiffs to single damages? Effect on an R&D vehicle is less cer-
tain since the statutory approach to limitation of damages is less ex-
plicit than is NCRA § 3. Effective counseling is indispensable to
achieving maximum availability of the NCRA § 4 shields for joint
ventures as well as their sponsors. The shields afforded by NCRA §
33. Id.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (1984).
35. Id.
36. See infra text accompanying note 39.
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4 do not specify the persons to whom the shields are available.
Rather, § 4 looks to compensable injuries caused by offensive con-
duct that is within "the scope of a notification" filed with FTC and
DOJ.37 According to NCRA § 6(a), such notifications can be filed
by "[a]ny party to a joint research and development venture, acting
on such venture's behalf."3 8 It is possible to argue, and plaintiffs
surely will, that "joint research and development venture" is a term
of art embracing only the activities of persons contracting to bring
the ventures into existence; that detrebling provisions should be con-
strued strictly; and, that Congress intended only to encourage collab-
oration by principals rather than excesses by their creatures. The
first line of response is that NCRA § 2(a)(6)'s definition of venture
focuses on activities pursuant to contract contemplating one or more
explicitly permitted purposes and that the NCRA §4 shields run to
conduct. Nonetheless, all of this commends that counsel to venturers,
if use of a formalized joint venture vehicle is important to the R&D
effort, not only clause the "notification" to detail organization and
operation of the vehicle (as part of the venture's "nature" evoked by
NCRA 9) but also cause the vehicle to become a party to the basic
contract. It would seem that an R&D vehicle embodied in a limited
partnership or a business trust almost inevitably must become party
to the base contract. This is not true of the incorporated vehicle. An
obvious purpose for causing it to be a party is to ensure availability
of the NCRA § 4 insulation.
. Boot-strapping? Putting aside significance of having the vehicle
become party to the base contract, those defending a joint venture
vehicle will argue that use of the phrase "acting on such venture's
behalf" in NCRA § 6(a) is simple English indicative of a remedial
purpose to shield all disclosed aspects of the venture including its
formal manifestation. Such an appeal may run afoul of strict con-
struction. However, if a suitably formalized vehicle is literally a
party to a contract being performed within the scope of NCRA §
2(a)(6), the plain language of NCRA § 6(a) is such as to make it
most difficult for a court to conclude that the vehicle is unentitled to
invoke NCRA § 4.
B. Conduct Within NCRA's Safe Harbors
What does NCRA shield? Conduct in realms beyond the "hard
sciences" is a given.40 What of physical, chemical, biological, mathe-
matical, cybernetic and other areas of functional development be-
37. 15 U.S.C. § 4305(a)&(b) (1984).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 4305(a) (1984) (emphasis supplied).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 4305(a) (1984).
40. See supra text accompanying note 34.
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yond research in the hard sciences?
According to NCRA § 2(a)(6), proper purposes of a defined
venture extend beyond research to practical development including
"experimental production and testing of models, prototypes, equip-
ment, materials, and processes." '41 Clearly, this scope is not limited
to bench-scale production and testing. Neither is the NCRA devel-
opment cycle limited by considerations of siting experimental pro-
duction, performance of experimental production, disposition of its
product, duration of testing, or purpose of testing. There are no lim-
its upon either the sources of equipment, materials, models, processes
and prototypes to be tested or the identities of testers. This absence
of limitations raises interesting questions as to when experimental
production and testing can be deemed to lose their experimental
characters. Presumably, if the process to be licensed or materials to
be yielded by proprietary processes involve such dangers to employ-
ees or third parties that standards of performance (including quality
control techniques) must be developed before licensing can com-
mence, long production runs can be not only justified but demanded
before testing of a process or its product can be regarded as com-
plete. 2 While it may be relatively simple for a third party to infer
that an ultimate product is in full non-experimental production and
distribution, such a perception is not infallible. Further, validity of
such a perception is even less likely in context of intermediate mater-
ials and customized applications than it is with consumer products.
Some sorts of R&D produce nothing but prototypes (e.g. cus-
tomized multi-tasked computers and chemical reactors) which are
quite susceptible of installation at a customer's site for simultaneous
experimentation and commercial use until there is a quantum leap to
the next generation of pertinent technology. Commercial worth of
various processes can be gauged only by permitting the marketplace
to test yielded material (e.g., superficially identical organic chemi-
cals or man-made fibers produced by different processes frequently
prove to be anything but fungible and to have differing commercially
significant handling characteristics when in the process machinery of
customers for such intermediates). Intrinsic handling differences
among seemingly generic products can occur on not only company-
by-company but also, within an enterprise, plant-by-plant bases.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(6)(C) (1984).
42. Consider, quite beyond ordinary products liability and workplace safety ramifica-
tions, the time and investment implicit in processing applications for marketing clearances
pertinent to color additives, food additives, medical devices, new drugs, radioactive devices and
toxic chemicals under the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321 (1982), the Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982), and the Radiation Control for
Health & Safety Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 263b-263n (1982). See generally, FOOD & DRUG LAW
INSTITUTE, SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY COMMEMORATIVE VOLUME OF FOOD AND DRUG
LAW (1984).
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Consumer-oriented software companies openly market "beta-ware",
inviting customers (at a deep discount from the targeted price of an
ultimate product) to report "bugs" as part of the development pro-
cess. In the ultimate, there is no consistently bright line to delineate
the end of testing contemplated by NCRA. Resolution of the issue
will present fact questions on industry-by-industry, process-by-pro-
cess, product-by-product, and service-by-service bases.
An inevitable question will involve demarcation of testing ap-
propriate to R&D as distinct from ordinary customer service. For
example, awareness of either intra-product differences or differences
among customers' processing set-ups, or both, cause various market-
ing organizations to maintain "applications and development" staffs
to give customers aid in coping with peculiarities of the marketers'
products. NCRA-defined joint ventures, which NCRA § 2(a)(6) in-
vites to become licensors, that undertake test production are not
likely to refuse such applications and development cooperation to im-
portant licensees. When venturers so opt to cooperate, they will do
well to plan to be in a position to prove that customer service is part
of the testing essential to development as well as marketing of li-
censed technology presumably contemplated by NCRA § 2(a)(6).
This, of course, assumes that the NCRA safe harbors are worth the
effort.
III. The NCRA Rule of Reason
Are availabilities of the NCRA rule of reason and limitation of
damages matters of concern in the real world? The per se label is an
antitrust term of art usually having meaning only in context of judi-
cial applications of § 1 of the Sherman Act and its state analogues.
Mere organization or existence of a joint venture for purposes other
than those which are fairly clearly anticompetitive never has been
characterized as offensive per se to the Sherman Act or any other
federal antitrust norm.43 Thus, a quick appraisal of NCRA's rule of
reason might seem to suggest that its principal contribution is redun-
dancy and that whatever benefits NCRA offers lie in the so-called
"detrebling" therapy and inducing potential private plaintiffs into
paranoia concerning assessment of full costs for unsuccessful prose-
cutions. If this were true, it would be appropriate to ignore the
NCRA rule of reason and proceed immediately to develop how limi-
tation of liability is attained and maintained.
43. In the course of deliberations leading to enactment of NCRA, this conclusion was
phrased in different fashions. One of the most valuable is the observation that, "if properly
structured, most joint ventures are compatible with the antitrust laws provided they do not
include other ancillary restraints historically considered unlawful". H.R. REP. No. 656, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1984).
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A. "Rule of Reason Standard"
Implicit in the leap to limited liability would be acceptance of a
thesis that NCRA's "rule of reason standard" is little beyond a reaf-
firmation of the obvious. However, it is necessary to test this thesis.
NCRA § 3 is remarked before enlargement on attainment and main-
tenance of limitation of liability is pursued.
Rule of Reason Standard
Sec. 3. In any action under the antitrust laws, or under any
State law similar to the antitrust laws, the conduct of any per-
son in making or performing a contract to carry out a joint re-
search and development venture shall not be deemed illegal per
se; such conduct shall be judged on the basis of its reasonable-
ness, taking into account all relevant factors affecting competi-
tion, including, but not limited to, effects on competition in
properly defined, relevant research and development markets."
(emphasis supplied)
This is curious language. NCRA § 3 not only clearly imposes its
"rule of reason standard" on much more than organization and oper-
ation of NCRA-defined ventures but also mandates "relevant fac-
tors" for analyses. Further, § 3 anamolously implicates statutes to
which per se formulae are quite foreign. Thus, clarity is attempted
to be served herein by referring to the "NCRA rule of reason" as
distinct from that normally associated with § I of the Sherman Act.
Only under § 1 of the Sherman Act and various state statutes
identical or substantially similar to it4 have courts characterized
certain species of conduct as offensive per se. Yet, "antitrust laws" is
a term liberally defined by NCRA § 2(a)(1)4" to embrace4 7 not only
the Sherman Act, import-oriented antitrust provisions of the Wilson
Tariff Act (which are similar to the Sherman Act), and the Clayton
Act but also FTCA §548 "to the extent [it] applies to unfair methods
of competition." There is no distinction among legal, equitable and
criminal applications of the Sherman, Wilson and Clayton Acts.
There is no distinction between administrative remedies available to
FTC staff and matters originally cognizable by courts.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (1984).
45. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (§ 1 of Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)); N.Y. Gen'l Business Law § 340 et seq. (Supp. 1988); ANN. CAL. Bus.
& PROF. COo § 16700 et seq. (Supp. 1988).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1) (1984).
47. By incorporating "subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act", NCRA §
2(a)(1) includes the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982); §§ 73-77 of the Wilson Tariff
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1982); and, the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-26 (1982).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982).
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The overall effect of the definition is remarkable. For example,
most substantive provisions of the Clayton Act condemn particular-
ized species of conduct without necessary reference to actors' pur-
poses49 and some of the Act's proscriptions dispense with need to
prove anticompetitive effects.50 Yet, excepting only §§ 7 and 8 of the
Clayton Act, 51 no substantive provisions of the Clayton Act have pe-
culiar relevance to joint ventures generally let alone those defined by
NCRA § 2(a)(6). It goes without saying that FTC jurisprudence is
not marked with great respect for the rule of reason.5 Nonetheless,
if NCRA § 3 is applicable to challenged conduct, prosecutors of all
Sherman and Clayton Act theories as well as FTCA "unfair meth-
ods of competition" and all Clayton Act theories involving "the con-
duct of any person in . . . performing a contract to carry out a joint
research and development venture" will be burdened to make out a
rule of reason case including competitive effects in relevant R&D
markets.
The authors point out that the buckshot approach of NCRA § 3
differs dramatically from rifle-shot amendments of the Sherman and
FTC Acts effected by ETCA Title IV,5 as well as the administra-
tively-controlled availability of a Certificate of Review (COR) under
ETCA Title III.5 Doing so, the authors do not decry the approach
of NCRA § 3. They merely point out that it plays roles far greater
than stating the obvious or avoiding judicial evolution of per se for-
mulae condemning competitors' joint R&D efforts. NCRA §3 ther-
apy inescapably includes effective albeit indirect amendment of vari-
ous "antitrust laws" in so far as they otherwise apply to formation
and conduct of joint R&D ventures oriented to purposes blessed by
NCRA § 2(a)(6).
Assuming a jurisdictional nexus, the point of classic per se con-
demnations under § 1 of the Sherman Act is to relieve trial courts
49. NCRA §§ 2(a),2(c)-(e), 3, 7, 8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), 13(c)-(e) 14, 18, 19 (1982).
Note that § 2(f) of the Clayton Act focuses on defendant's knowing receipt of an otherwise
prohibited price discrimination. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f).
50. NCRA § 2(c)-(e). 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(c)-(e)(1982).
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 19 (1982). It should be noted that a non-substantive part of the
Clayton Act, which has pertinence to joint ventures of substantial size, is also arguably, albeit
nonsensically affected by the NCRA rule of reason. § 7A of the Clayton Act, looking to timely
prior notice of various combinations, entails inter alia civil penalties for non-compliance. 15
U.S.C. § 18A(g)(1) (1982).
52. See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321-22 (1966).
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a & 45(a)(3) (1982).
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4012-21 (1982). There are other rifle-shot exonerations from antitrust
proscriptions. See, e.g., the Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982); Defense Produc-
tion Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2158 & 2158a (1982); Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 638(d)
(1982). Note that the Webb-Pomerene exemptions are particularized whereas those under the
Defense Production and Small Business Acts are far broader. Further, each of the latter
preempts FTCA § 5(a)(1) without discrimination between "unfair methods of competition"
and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices".
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from weighing allegedly benign purposes of the actors or the relative
inconsequence of their conduct in connection with price stabilization
and other forms of direct market rigging with which the courts have
had considerable experience." Obviously, the "performing" language
of NCRA § 3 provokes a question as to whether it undoes any per se
doctrines to the degree they impact, say, licensing of venture-devel-
oped technology. This is but one of many questions raised by NCRA
§ 3.
B. Sherman Act Implications
The point of this article is neither to dwell on the chicken or egg
problem concerning which of the "rule of reason" or "per se doc-
trine" is the essential expression of § 1 of the Sherman Act, nor to
complain about judicial inclusion of conduct less reprehensible than
competitors' joint market-rigging within the catalogue of per se of-
fenses. 6 Rather, since Congress saw fit to subject statutes other than
§ 1 of the Sherman Act to the NCRA rule of reason and to evoke
"relevant factors" which must be considered by NCRA rule of rea-
son adjudicators, it is appropriate to consider various applications of
both § 1 of the Sherman Act and other comprehended federal stat-
utes in order to suggest the degree to which Congress indulged some-
thing beyond merely reassuring therapy. Ventures defined by NCRA
§ 2(a)(6) provide the context for applications considered in this arti-
cle. Neither time nor space permits exhaustive expositions of affected
federal statutes. No "State law similar to the antitrust laws" 57 is
developed in detail but, after remarking upon the impact of NCRA
on the Federal Trade Commission Act, the authors draw the
reader's attention to the distinct possibility that Congress failed to
burden prosecutions under certain of the states' "little FTC
acts" 9 with the NCRA rule of reason.
1. Section I of the Sherman Act.-Focusing on § 1 of the
Sherman Act, it goes without saying that the prosecutorial theory
always postulates a joint venture of some sort. Section 1 addresses
restraints on trade effected by "contract, combination ...or con-
spiracy."60 If unassisted by precedent confirming clear availability of
a per se characterization of the conduct in question,6" the rule of
55. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
56. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)
(resale price maintenance); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (ty-
ing); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (tying).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (1984).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 4301 (1984).
59. See infra text accompanying notes 247-252.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
61. See supra note 55.
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reason prosecutor has the heavy burden of establishing the anticom-
petitive purpose of those alleged to have agreed on a course of con-
duct or the substantially adverse effect on competition of the alleged
collaborators' conduct. 62 Additionally, if the prosecutor is a private
person proceeding under §§ 4 or 16 of the Clayton Act, she must
establish the personal injury experienced or to be experienced"3 by
plaintiff. If there is an admitted affiliation for a purpose (such as a
joint venture contract) between or among parties alleged to be effect-
ing an unreasonable restraint of trade, the "contract, combination
• . . or conspiracy" element of proof is satisfied for which reason
plaintiff's principal attention will be to proving an actual restraint as
well as its anticompetitive purposes and/or effects.
Although a more recent decision of the Supreme Court may
have changed the ultimate burden on triers of fact to a degree,"
Justice Brandeis' opinion in Chicago Board of Trade v. U.S. contin-
ues to be the leading elucidation of the rule of reason.
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competi-
tion. To determine that question the court must ordinarily con-
sider the facts peculiar to the business, . . . its condition before
and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual and probable. The history of the restraint,
. . . the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
... . This is not because good intention will save an achieved
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge
of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences."
The Chicago Board arrangement entailed limited price freezes mea-
sured in hours or weekends as incidental tools of a larger self-regula-
tion scheme among persons otherwise competitors. The purpose was
to serve commodities traders' access to knowledge of market prices
and availability of pertinent commodities.
The much later Professional Engineers decision (perhaps un-
consciously) refined the purpose of rule of reason analysis to deter-
mination of whether the restraint in question has the net effect of
promoting or suppressing the competitive process. 68 Prior to the
holding, it was common to rely on Chicago Board for the short-hand
proposition that the rule of reason condemns only arrangements that
62. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918); National
Soc'y. of Prof. Eng'rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 686-96 (1978).
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 & 26 (1982).
64. National Soc'y. of Prof. Eng'rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 686-96 (1978).
65. 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918).
66. See supra note 64.
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are "on balance" anticompetitive. It is quite possible to argue that
Professional Engineers does not prejudice the essentially neutral re-
straint that improbably promotes or suppresses the process of compe-
tition. In any event, decisions after Chicago Board and before Pro-
fessional Engineers tended to adhere to the view that a rule of
reason analysis condemns an agreement which has the purpose or
likely effect of significantly reducing competition. There was no
broad adherence to a philosophy tolerating restraints prejudicing
competition because they were complemented by aspirations to
achieve some higher good. Professional Engineers' concern with a
net effect did not alter this theme. Indeed, language in the recent
NCAA v. U. of Oklahoma decision marks a disposition to honor
Brandeis' approach. The Supreme Court refused inter alia argument
that the price-fixing and market allocation implicit in the NCAA
football television plan should be treated as offensive per se. Doing
so, the Court honored an argument that the very nature of the indus-
try was such that horizontal restraints were necessary to marketing
its product. 7
In any event, assuming absence of an anticompetitive purpose,
note that Brandeis guided us to look beyond immediate effects to the
probability that a restraint would come to injure competition. This
served a philosophy best epitomized (in a later per se case) to the
effect that the Sherman Act is predicated upon a conviction that
"unrestrained interaction of competitive forms will yield the best al-
location of . . . resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and
the greatest material progress." '68 Does NCRA § 3 modify the rule
of reason enunciated by Brandeis?
There are suggestions that NCRA §3 narrows the litigatory fo-
cus to actual effects on competition. The authors disagree. They sub-
mit that invocation of "all relevant factors affecting competition" by
NCRA § 3 does not narrow the Chicago Board rule of reason. Fac-
tors "affecting competition" include not only venturers' purposes but
also "actual and probable" effects69 of the R&D venture. While it is
inescapable that NCRA §3 also orients courts to actual "effects...
in . . . relevant research and development markets," it is equally in-
escapable that Congress took care to indicate that the total analysis
is "not limited" to effects7" in R&D markets.
If resort to legislative history is necessary (which does not, at
this juncture, seem to be the case), there is no doubt that Congress'
particularity in § 3 is intended to guide courts "in focusing on the
67. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
68. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
69. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (1984).
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major potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of joint
R&D ventures"." Moreover, there is no explicit suggestion that sig-
nificant anticompetitive effects can be compensated for by good in-
tentions concerning or good effects in contexts other than competi-
tive. Yet, those disquieted by potential for twisting the rule of reason
to burden courts with identifying desirable societal goals (other than
promotion of competition), and weighing such goals against injuries
to the competitive process,"' will not be happy with the legislative
history's allusions to economies of scale.7" Unhappiness should be
leavened by recognition that, on an explicit level, NCRA § 3 neither
commends nor otherwise purports to authorize courts to balance
other values against protection of the competitive process.
2. Import of NCRA § 2(b) Exclusions and Qualifica-
tions.-What of conduct hitherto deemed offensive per se to § 1 of
the Sherman Act? No explicit inroads are made on per se doctrines
but nonetheless there are inroads! Focusing only on NCRA §§ 2 and
3, consider price-restricted licenses among defined venturers other-
wise subject to the per se rule of Line Material.4 The manner in
which NCRA § 2(b) qualifies exclusions75 from the definition of
"joint research and development venture" is provocative both in iso-
lation and, more appropriately, in context of § 2(a)(6). NCRA §
2(b) is superficially concerned with limiting "activities" of defined
ventures. However, it has other implications which demand present
consideration. Discussion of structural implications (i.e., whether in-
dulgence in any activity excluded by § 2(b) bars an otherwise quali-
fying venture from the NCRA §§ 3, 4 and 5 safe harbors) is de-
ferred to later commentary concerning organizing and maintaining
R&D ventures. 76
At this point, it is important to note that each of the three
NCRA § 2(b) exclusions is qualified and that each exclusion deals
with activities that can be the approximate occasion of antitrust vio-
lations. Potencies for the three explicit qualifications to accommo-
date defined ventures' evasion of otherwise strong Sherman Act poli-
cies, or otherwise to burden prosecutions under § 1 of the Sherman
71. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of the Conference, H.R. Rep. No.
98-1044, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 9. Earlier, the conferees observed that the NCRA rule of reason
requires that "courts must realistically analyze the competitive effects of any challenged joint
R&D venture." Id.
72. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, 186-89 (1977)
[hereinafter L. SULLIVAN].
73. Supra note 71. See also S. REP. No. 427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3116.
74. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b) (1984). For the text of NCRA § 2(a)(6) and 2(b), see supra
text accompanying note 29.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 323-328.
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Act, are considered at this point.
(a) Data exchange among competitors.-The first qualified ex-
clusion, set forth at NCRA §2(b)(1)," addresses competitors' ex-
changes of costs, prices and other sensitive data. The exclusion re-
lates to U.S. v. Container Corporation 7 and various DOJ policy
statements.7 9 The second, qualifiedly excluding conduct "restricting,
requiring, or otherwise involving the production or marketing by...
a party to [the] venture of any product, process or service", 80 pro-
vokes attention to allocative and tying per se doctrines under § 1 of
the Sherman Act as well as, ultimately, § 3 of the Clayton Act.81
The third, qualifiedly excluding restraints imposed in connection
with transfers of "inventions or developments" generated outside of
the agreed venture as well as restraints on other R&D efforts of par-
ties to the venture, 8 has more than an occult relationship to various
per se applications concerning not only tying in intellectual property
areas but also technology transfers generally.
Although each of the NCRA § 2(b) exclusions has its own
qualification, and each qualification has its own phrasing, there are
common themes. The broadly-described excluded activities are not
necessarily characterized by NCRA or another statutory scheme as
illegal for indulgence by either ordinary enterprises or formally ar-
ranged joint ventures. Yet, the breadth of the exclusions is such that
particular manifestations of comprehended conduct may place actors
in at least the occasion of violating § 1 of the Sherman Act and
other statutory norms. Each of the qualifications operates to permit
undoing the exclusion it modifies when to do so is germane to serving
one or more of the acceptable purposes delineated at NCRA §
2(a)(6). Accordingly, there is at least a superficial potency for remit-
ting venturers' otherwise illegal conduct to the NCRA rule of
reason.
Operation of the qualifications is somewhat analogous to the
"cost justification" and "meeting competition" defenses to price dis-
criminations otherwise prohibited by § 2 of the Clayton Act.8" While
these "Robinson-Patman" 84 defenses are absolute (even though the
77. 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(1) (1984).
78. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
79. See, U.S. Dept. of Justice Antitrust Guide for International Operations, (Jan.
1977), reprinted in [Jan-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 799, at E-I (Feb. 1,
1977) and U.S. Dept. of Justice Antitrust Guide Concerning Joint Ventures, (Nov. 1980),
reprinted in [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 992 (Special Supp.) at 6
(Dec. 4, 1980). See infra text accompanying notes 91-94.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(2) (1984).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(3) (1984).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)&(b) (1982).
84. United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962) (cost justification); Standard Oil
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shielded discrimination is injurious to competition85), the qualifica-
tions to NCRA § 2(b) exclusions do not have potencies beyond enti-
tling comprehended conduct to NCRA safe harbors. Conduct per-
mitted by a qualification, along with all other indulgences by a
venture defined at NCRA § 2(a)(6), is exposed to prosecution by
reference to the NCRA rule of reason.
NCRA's legislative history does not betray explicit recognition
that conduct otherwise offensive per se to § 1 of the Sherman Act
can be relegated to the NCRA rule of reason via the qualifications
to NCRA § 2(b). Indeed, there are suggestions to the contrary. 86 Do
the qualifications truly present potencies for undoing per se doctrines
in terms of defined ventures? Response to this demands detailed con-
sideration of NCRA § 2(b).
The text of NCRA §2(b)(1) excludes
(1) exchanging information among competitors relating to
costs, sales, profitability, prices, marketing, or distribution of
any product, process, or service that is not reasonably required
to conduct the research and development that is the purpose of
such venture8"
from the concept of "joint research and development venture" for
purposes of NCRA § 2(a)(6). Note that the basic exclusion is un-
concerned with exchanges among non-competitors even though they
are potential competitors. This qualified exclusion demands attention
to not only precedent but also DOJ policies concerning data ex-
changes among actual competitors.
U.S. v. Container Corporation of America dealt with competi-
tors' exchange of price data without agreement to adhere to any
pricing mode. Defendants accounted for approximately 90% of cor-
rugated containers marketed from plants in southeastern U.S.A. The
price exchange was found "to stabilize prices though at a downward
level." Justice Douglas wrote for four of a majority of five. He
opined that
The continuation of some price competition is not fatal to
the Government's case. The limitation or reduction of price com-
petition brings the case within the ban, for as . . . held in...
Socony-Vacuum . . ., interference with the setting of price by
free market forces is unlawful per se.88
Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951) (meeting competition).
85. "Section 2(b) excludes classic cartel-like behavior by participants in a joint R&D
venture from coverage under the Act." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1044, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS 3132.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(1) (1984) (emphasis supplied).
87. 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969).
88. Id. at 338.
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This language was and is unfortunate. There is a potency for citation
out of context to the effect that competitors' exchange of pricing
data, accompanied by a stabilization effect, is offensive per se. The
context is to the contrary. Context includes the fact that Justice For-
tas, supplying the fifth vote necessary to reinstate a complaint dis-
missed by a trial judge, concurred in the judgment on the specific
understanding that the majority opinion did not hold that competi-
tors' exchanges of price data are offensive per se.89 However, he
stressed a perspective that such exchanges, accompanied by proof of
substantial dampening of price competition, made out a rule of rea-
son case in consequence of which there was "no need to consider the
possibility of a per se violation."9 Writing for the dissenters, Justice
Marshall defended the need for a full rule of reason inquiry.91
Admitting that competitors' naked agreements to effect price
stabilizations are and should be regarded as offensive per se to § 1 of
the Sherman Act, the authors suggest neither that competitors' mere
exchanges of data concerning actual costs and prices are inimical to
free market precepts nor that Justice Fortas' position in Container
Corporation itself was much more than a half-way house between
per se condemnation and the true rule of reason. Rather, the authors
point to the facts that Chicago Board necessarily involved direct
price stabilization whereby traders could avoid foolish bids and that
perfect competition models presuppose perfect knowledge. In doing
so, the authors admit a prejudice to the effect that, while neither a
perfect data base nor perfect competition is attainable by humans
burdened with imperfect perception, free market forces are
prejudiced rather than fostered by restrictions on data exchanges
among sophisticated persons so long as they abstain from agreements
as to pricing in procurements or markets. Data exchanges are no
more the occasion of violations than any other contact involving
competitors. The authors acknowledge that their prejudice systems
have little to do with either the state of the law or the attitudes of
prosecutors. The latter consideration evokes consideration of DOJ
attitudes.
In a contemporary context other than NCRA, DOJ personali-
ties have expressed great concern about price-sensitive data ex-
changes among persons otherwise competitors in context of their
89. id. at 339.
90. Id. at 340. Note that Justice Jackson was one of a recent majority remitting a
resale price maintenance case to rule of reason analysis when plaintiff, terminated in the wake
of a competing distributor's complaints about price-cutting, failed to prove that an agreement
between the complainant and the master marketer focused on resale pricing. Business Elec-
tronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., - U.S. -, 1988 (Westlaw 39121) (U.S.).
91. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4012-21 (1982).
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combination as applicants for a COR under ETCA Title 111. The
official form pertinent to such application contains a special "note"
discouraging data exchanges and suggesting that, if data are to be
exchanged, they be processed through an unrelated third party.9"
Presumably, the third party would perform some sort of a sanitizing
process." DOJ sensitivity has translated into clauses qualifying
CORs, presumably pursuant to ETCA § 303(b)(3),95 to require min-
imization of data exchanges. 96 These clauses are not unlike NCRA §
2(b)(1).
To those who regard Container Corporation as setting a per se
rule, NCRA § 2(b) effectively undoes it in the case of defined ven-
tures in which two or more of the venturers are competitors. To
those who believe that Container Corporation inevitably must be re-
garded as a rule of reason case albeit a harshly restrictive one, it
would seem - again in the case of defined ventures involving competi-
tors - that NCRA §2(b) at least gives vitality to Justice Marshall's
dissent in Container Corporation97 and that, thanks to NCRA § 3,
defined joint venturers' "reasonably required" data exchanges have
escaped Justice Fortas' willingness to accept data exchanges followed
by price stabilization as conclusive. Adopting an admittedly inexact
analogy to exemptions practice in venues such as securities regula-
tion, 98 the authors advise that venturers who wish to take advantage
of the qualification to NCRA § 2(b)(1) must anticipate - by prepar-
ing a "pro-competitive" brief when forming a defined venture - ulti-
mately having to prove that data exchanges were "reasonably re-
quired" to serve the Congressional-approved purposes set forth at
NCRA § 2(a)(6)."' The authors do not suggest that NCRA §
2(b)(1) frees otherwise competing venturers to use NCRA as a cover
for collective albeit indirect fixing of prices they individually charge
or pay for goods or services either beyond or comprehended by the
92. U.S. Dept. of Commerce Form ITA 4093P (5/83), D. Unkovic, J. Maher & N.
LaMont, International Opportunities & the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, B-2202
(1984).
93. See, e.g., Maple Flouring Mfrs. Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(b)(3) (1982).,
95. J. Maher & N. LaMont, Export Trade Certificates of Review: Will Efficacy Be
Permitted?, 2 DICK. J. INT'L L. 241, 264 n.134 (1984), reprinted in CORP. COUNs. ANN. (Bur-
chell, Rubenzahl & Schwartz ed. 1985).
96. See supra note 90.
97. Availability of a "securities" or "transaction" exemption is a defense to private
suits under §12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(1) (1984).
98. Such homework should proceed with sensitivity to Congress' intent that "reasona-
bly required" imports an "objective standard and thus does not refer to the subjective opinion
of the participants, but rather to whether the particular circumstances at issue establish the
need to exchange the type of information in question and to do so in the planned manner". S.
REP. No. 427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3113.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(2) (1984).
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venture.
(b) Restrictions agreed upon by the parties.-NCRA § 2(b)(2)
excludes
(2) entering into any agreement or engaging in any other con-
duct restricting, requiring, or otherwise involving the production
or marketing by any person who is a party to such venture of
any product, process, or service, other than the production or
marketing of proprietary information developed through such
venture, such as patents and trade secrets' 0
from the venture defined at NCRA § 2(a)(6). Unlike §§ 2(b)(1)"01
& (3),'02 the second qualified exclusion does not invoke a reasonabil-
ity standard. Whereas NCRA §2(b)(1) reads on exchanges of data
among "competitors" and is unconcerned with such exchanges
among non-competitors, the basic exclusion in § 2(b)(2) looks to re-
strictions inter se agreed upon by parties to a defined venture. Thus,
by definition, § 2(b)(2) does not exclude imposition of restraints on
third parties and, if such restraints serve licensing under § 2(a)(6),
they are subjected to only NCRA § 3 rule of reason analysis!
Once one overcomes inelegance of the qualification to §
2(b)(2)'s exclusions, one finds that it constitutes almost a forthright
invitation to capitalize upon the fruits of the joint venture by negoti-
ating restrictions on venturers' respective discretions to use or mar-
ket proprietary data (including but not limited to patents and trade
secrets) developed by a defined venture. It is clear to the authors
that Congress did not intend to afford NCRA safe-harbors for joint
procurement, production and/or marketing ventures in and of them-
selves. Neither did Congress purport to condemn them. There is ex-
plicit recognition that such ventures may have "significant procom-
petitive aspects". 08 It is equally clear to the authors that NCRA §
2(a)(6) was not intended to promote ventures beyond those essen-
tially oriented to R&D and commercial realization upon the fruits of
what is presumed to be intrinsically risky R&D. But, what do §
2(a)(6) and the qualification to § 2(b)(2) say when they are taken
together?
As noted earlier," we are taught that statutory construction
begins with the statute itself. NCRA §2(a)(6) contemplates not only
research, bench-scale development, reductions to practice, develop-
ment and testing of "basic engineering techniques," prosecution of
100. See supra text accompanying note 86.
101. See infra text accompanying note 105.
102. S. REP. No. 427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3112-3113.
103. See supra text accompanying note 28.
104. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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patent applications, and licensing of know-how and patents but also
full-scale albeit prototypical production and, to the degree appropri-
ate to adequate testing, marketing of materials and services by or on
behalf of a defined venture. 10 5 There is no limitation on licensees;
they can be parties or strangers to the venture. What beyond this is
implied by NCRA § 2(b)(2)?
This subsection addresses parties to ventures defined at §
2(a)(6), excluding their agreements and "other conduct" mandating
"production or marketing" decisions concerning "products, processes
and services" extrinsic to the venture's purposes. The effect of the
qualification is to permit agreements and "other conduct" whereby
the parties to a venture undertake restraints upon their individual
discretions concerning marketing and, seemingly, uses of formulated
proprietary data "such as patents and trade secrets" developed
"through" the defined venture. If one ignores potential for joint ven-
turers to be or to become competitors, this would be a truism. How-
ever, it says much to parties to defined ventures who are actual or
potential competitors.
By way of an aside, the qualification can be somewhat obscure
in that "production or marketing of proprietary information devel-
oped through" the venture is insensible if one assigns the same
weight to the word "production" in the qualification as the word en-
joys in the main body of the exclusion. It is obvious that Congress'
purpose was directly to bless inter-venturer restrictions on their own
respective production uses as well as marketing of proprietary data
developed "through" the venture. Parties to formation of a permitted
venture are not disqualified from being its licensees. One method of
parsing the qualification permits a sensible conclusion in which "pro-
duction . . . of . . ." data is the equivalent of "formulating" data.
In any event, given the venture's ability to license parties as well as
others, it is inescapable that the qualification to NCRA § 2(b)(2)
serves to permit imposition of restrictions on parties - even though
they be competitors - in much the same way non-parties can be
restricted. In effect, Congress blessed parties' allocations inter se of
the exploitative values of venture developments and ordained that
such allocations be afforded NCRA rule of reason analysis.
This freedom to impose certain restrictions raises a question as
to what else competing parties to a defined venture can accomplish
inter se, through agreements or "other conduct" mandating or "oth-
erwise involving" formulation or marketing of venture proprietary
data, that otherwise might present significant antitrust difficulties.
NCRA § 2(a)(6) permits collective licensing of proprietary data.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(3) (1984).
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There is neither a mandate to license nor a limitation on the terms of
licenses nor a compulsion to license persons other than the venturers.
On the face of the matter, § 2(a)(6) exists to permit venturers' con-
tinued collective enjoyment of fruits of collective R&D. The qualifi-
cation to NCRA § 2(b)(2) surely exists to permit restraints inter se
on venturers' marketing proprietary data of the venture and, if such
marketing is permitted, the formulation of data marketed.
Licensing under § 2(a)(6) presumptively can use "field of use"
and other licit restrictions. Parties to the venture are not disqualified
as licensees. In effect, the qualification confirms venturers' collective
ability not only to impose "field of use" and other usual restrictions
on others' enjoyment (including use or marketing) of venture data
but prospectively to divide the turf among the venturers. Such re-
strictions, of course, are intrinsic to the patent monopoly but NCRA
§ 2(b)(2) looks to venturers' conduct only anticipatory of achieving
commercially valuable know-how and trade secrets as well as pat-
ents. By definition, there is no federal law generally protecting trade
secrets and know-how as such.
(c) Restraints imposed by § 2(b)(3).-It is necessary to consider
usual Sherman Act interfaces with technology transfers in order to
fully assess the message of NCRA. Before doing so, NCRA §
2(b)(3) demands abbreviated consideration since it too deals with
such transfers. Section 2(b) excludes parties to defined ventures
from
(3) entering into any agreement or engaging in any other con-
duct -
(A) to restrict or require the sale, licensing, or sharing
of inventions or developments not developed through
such venture, or
(B) to restrict or require participation by such party in
other research and development activities,
that is not reasonably required to prevent misappropriation of
proprietary information contributed by any person who is a
party to such venture or of the results of such venture. 106
Here we see the "reasonably required" standard used in a narrower
fashion than its use in NCRA § 2(b)(1). 1°7 The point of the qualifi-
cation to § 2(b)(3) is to permit venturers to stay within the definition
at NCRA § 2(a)(6) even though they knowingly agree on restricting
their freedom of action in specified areas otherwise unrelated to the
106. See supra text accompanying note 86.
107. 35 U.S.C. §§ 261 & 271 (1982).
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venture if their purpose is to protect against misappropriation of pro-
prietary data developed by the venture or contributed to it by a
party, and the restraints are "reasonably related" to such purpose.
Species of conduct external to a defined venture that can be re-
strained via § 2(b)(3) are not only transfers of technology developed
outside the venture but also participations in R&D independent of
the defined venture. The qualification seems entirely sensible in that
it does little more than perpetuate a common law disposition to relax
the ordinary prejudice against particularized undertakings of re-
straints to the degree appropriate to protecting the benefit of an oth-
erwise legitimate bargain.
3. A Quick Look at Patents and Know-How.-Before dwelling
further on imports of NCRA §§ 2(b)(2)&(3), a quick look at pat-
ents and know-how in the antitrust crucible is appropriate. The tech-
nique is first to remark each of them generally and then, because it
is not uncommon to encounter single licenses to practice related pat-
ents and know-how, to consider leading precedent that effectively
reads on both.
Implicit in a patentee's power to exclude others from making,
using or selling 0 8 is the right to allow another or others to practice
under one or more of the claims allowed by the patent. The right to
license is the power to permit others to practice some but not all of
the allowed claims of the patent and otherwise to limit licensees'
practice within the patent monopoly. A holder of a patent can be
barred from enforcing it against alleged infringers if the holder is
using the patent to restrain conduct beyond the ambit of the monop-
oly conferred by the patent.' 9 Conduct may be characterized as pat-
ent misuse even though it does not violate antitrust laws."' The mis-
use defense is available even to an infringer not directly affected by
the misuse."' On the other hand, misuse may be equivalent to an
antitrust violation and confer standing for an affirmative claim."'
Thus, tying unpatented items to sales of patented machinery is offen-
sive per se to the Sherman Act if a "not insubstantial" amount of
108. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492-94 (1942).
109. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140-41 (1969). See
criticism of misuse doctrine in address by C. Rule, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust before The John Marshall Law School, 14-20.
110. See supra note 103 at 493-94.
111. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
112. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). Fuller consideration
of tying is deferred to discussion in connection with § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14
(1982). See infra text accompanying notes 211-225. However, note the U.S. Department of
Justice Vertical Restraints Guidelines, §§ 2-4825 (Jan. 1985) suggesting that non-price verti-
cal restraints always are subject to rule of reason analyses and that analyses of licensing are
not as rigorous as other non-price restraints. Id. at § 2.4.
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commerce is involved."1 ' Ordinarily, however, licensing by a holder
who unilaterally determines how the patent pie is to be sliced is sub-
ject only to rule of reason analysis. There are considerable antitrust
implications in doing multilaterally what a holder can do unilater-
ally. Thus, the fact that a product or process is patented does not
ordinarily warrant the holder's combination with competitors collec-
tively to fix royalties or to allocate markets although the holder uni-
laterally may be able licitly to impose not only such restraints on
licensees but to restrict the prices at which they sell.
Since a holder is free to license on a territorially restricted basis
within the U.S.A.,'1 4 it is permissible for a holder to refuse to license
save on its unilaterally determined terms which effectively allocate
markets within the U.S.A."' The same is true of product markets
unilaterally allocated through "field of use" restrictions." 6 These
consequences do not change the antitrust laws. Successful attack,
under § 1 of the Sherman Act, on such allocations requires proof of
agreement to allocate either by the holder with its actual (or poten-
tial) competitors or by the licensees with the holder serving as their
conduit. Further, both G.E. doctrines" 17 survive for which reason the
pertinent patent holder (a) can negotiate with a manufacturing li-
censee to the effect that the holder can dictate the price of the licen-
see's own sale of a product covered by the patent"' and (b) can set
up a distribution scheme whereby the holder dictates prices to be
exacted by its true agents for the purpose of sale (including agents
who receive product on consignments for resale)."' Of course, the
propositions concerning marketing via true agents and consignments
are not peculiar to patent holders.2 0
The G.E. decisions' leave for a patent holder to set its licensees'
prices, however, is narrowly construed' and a master marketer's
decision to market patented or unpatented goods via stocking agents
is one that must pay heed to various antitrust norms.'22
113. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982).
114. Ethyl Gas Co. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940).
115. Benger Labs., Ltd. v. R.K. Laros Co., 209 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1962), affd per
curiam, 317 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975).
116. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
117. Id. at 489-90.
118. Id. at 488.
119. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 21 (1964) (dicta); Meisrow v. Pepperidge
Farms, Inc., 703 F.2d 339, 341-43 (9th Cir. 1983); Harwick v. Nu-Way Oil Co., 589 F.2d
806, 808-11 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1979).
120. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 299-304 (1948); Cummer-Gra-
ham Co. v. Straight Side Basket Corp., 142 F.2d 646, 647 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 726 (1944).
121. Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 942 (1976); Roberts v. Exxon Corp., 427 F. Supp. 389, 391 (W.D. La. 1977).
122. A.& E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968); Thorns v.
Sutherland, 52 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1931).
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On the face of the matter, since G.E. relied on existence of the
holder's statutory warrant to maintain a federally-conferred monop-
oly as the basis for permitting a price-restrictive license, desires for
protection entertained by proprietors of production know-how (and
lesser proprietary data such as knowledge of customers' peculiari-
ties) are not so well grounded. Equitable and legal remedies nor-
mally available to proprietors of trade secrets are for the purpose of
avoiding, or affording damages for, tortious invasions of proprietary
rights but there is no legal guaranty against the successful reverse
engineer's practice. Even if a trade secret or know-how has been re-
sistant to reverse engineering or other legitimate method of destroy-
ing its proprietary nature, it always is subject to discovery. Paten-
tees' rights are protected for a defined number of years as society's
reward for the inventor's disclosures. By definition, the proprietor of
a trade secret maximizes its value by non-disclosure to the public.
Implicit in this is a potency for protection well beyond the limited
life of a patent. There is no obvious analogy between the absolute
legal monopoly for a term of years enjoyed by the patentee and the
de facto monopoly of the trade secret which may last forever or dis-
solve tomorrow. In fact, on a technological plane, patents and trade
secrets can be said to be philosophically opposed. However, data pro-
tectable as a trade secret may and often does extend well beyond
that patentable or otherwise truly protectable under current federal
law. The patent system's predicate of inducing disclosure aims at
discouraging maintenance of trade secrets. Further, technological
trade secrets inevitably relate to processes.
From this, it follows that price restrictions in know-how licenses
are not justifiable on the theory that sustained the G.E. price restric-
tion and agency holdings. On the other hand, restraints against a
know-how licensee's further revelation of data are entitled to rule of
reason analyses because they are qualified grants of property as are
field of use and geographic restrictions. 1 3 However, those licensing
know-how must be alert to attitudinal problems such as that nicely
summed in A&E Plastik Co. v. Monsanto Co. in which the Ninth
Circuit said
the critical question in an antitrust context is whether the
restriction may fairly be said to be ancillary to a commercially
supportable licensing arrangement, or whether the licensing
scheme is a sham set up for . . . controlling competition while
avoiding the consequences of the antitrust laws.124
They also should recall that the classic characterization of resale
123. 396 F.2d at 710, 715.
124. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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price maintenance as offensive per se to § 1 of the Sherman Act
came out of a context in which the proprietor of a trade secret
sought to enforce a resale price maintenance agreement against one
who knowingly interfered with it. 125 This contrasts sharply with pro-
tection afforded a price-restricted license, under a patent, against a
knowing interference.1 6
4. Technology Transfers: Precedents and per se Antitrust Vio-
lations.-With this background, it is useful to consider various tech-
nology transfer precedents. Earlier, price restraints saved by G.E.
from per se condemnation were remarked. 2 7 Now, it is necessary to
state what G.E. does not protect. G.E. does not permit the patent
holder to fix prices of unpatented products of patented processes or
machines.128 G.E. does not permit fixing resale prices. 29 Neither
does it permit the holder to be a participant in a concert of holders
or licensees or both, to fix prices.' 30
In Line Material, the Supreme Court refused to extend G.E.'s
teaching concerning a patent holder's unilateral imposition of a
price-fix on a manufacturing licensee to a situation involving price-
restrictive sublicensing by cross-licensees holding individual patents
for an electrical device and an improvement thereon. The improve-
ment patent could not be practiced without infringing the device pat-
ent. While the cross-licenses were royalty-free to the respective hold-
ers, they granted the improvement patent holder exclusive rights to
sub-license third parties on a price-restrictive basis which pricing the
device patent holder undertook to respect. So joining, "to maintain




Field of use restrictions unilaterally imposed on manufacturing
licensees involve distinctions similar to those in G.E. Thus, General
Talking Pictures confirmed availability of an infringement action
against a purchaser of a patented device from a use-restricted manu-
facturer-seller when each of the licensee and its customer knew that
the purchaser would put it to uses reserved by the licensor.13 Essen-
tially the same restriction was upheld by a Court of Appeals in Au-
125. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, a/I'd on
rehearing, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 116-118.
127. Cummer-Graham Co. v. Straight Side Basket Corp., 142 F.2d 646, 647 (5th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 726 (1944).
128. Ethyl Gas Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); United States v. Inivis
Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
129. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
130. Id. at 293-97, 305-15.
131. See supra note 125 at 181.
132. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, 176 F.2d 799, 802-03 (1st Cir.
1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
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tomatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research but the Supreme
Court did not reach the issue.?Ls The General Talking Pictures situ-
ation must not be confused with that in which a patentee markets
patented products subject to conditions restricting purchasers' use of
the product in which case the sale may be held to have exhausted the
patent monopoly. Nonetheless, ability licitly to restrict uses of li-
censed patented processes or of leased equipment embodying a pro-
cess patent or, in certain commercial circumstances generated by
unintegrated inter-brand competition,"" patented products is not
carte blanche for all of the games a technology marketer may play.
Patent holders' unilateral impositions of output ceilings on licen-
sees are subject only to rule of reason analyses"' but being party to
or a conduit for multilateral adoption of quotas would not be
shielded by patents. Tying, under certain circumstances,136 has been
characterized a per se offense. If the seller uses a patent position to
compel purchase of other patented or unpatented goods or services as
a condition of access to a patent monopoly, the tying patent (or
copyright) satisfies the "sufficient economic power" element of
proof.1 ' Yet, it would seem inescapable that a defined venture's ties
via a license from the venture has been relegated to the NCRA rule
of reason.
DOJ's now antiquated 1980 Antitrust Guide Concerning Re-
search Joint Ventures'33 was oriented to minimizing "fears, possibly
unwarranted, of exposure to antitrust attack." '1 9 In the Introduction
to the Guide, DOJ remarked that
it is useful to distinguish between three different kinds of
effects on competition. The first is the effect that the essential
elements of the joint research project would have in lessening
existing and potential competition between the participating
firms. If the joint activity has some probable and significant
(non de minimis) anticompetitive effect, the question becomes
whether the venture is, on balance, pro-competitive, taking into
account all aspects economically and technically necessary for
133. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (non-patent)
(territorial restraints on vendees' resales are to be tested by the rule of reason).
134. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 226 (D. Del.
1953), aff'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 109
F.Supp. 657 (D. N.J. 1951), modified, 207 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
935 (1954).
135. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). See infra text accompanying notes 214-218 and
221-225.
136. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (copyright).
137. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST GUIDE CONCERNING RESEARCH JOINT VEN-
TURES (Nov. 1980), reprinted in [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 992
(Special Supp.) (Dec. 4, 1980) [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDE].
138. Id. at 2.
139. Id. at 3.
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its success. Second, the project agreement, or other related
agreements between the participants, may contain specific re-
strictions that restrain competition. If these restrictions are not
unreasonably ancillary to the essential elements of the project or
are of undue scope or duration, they, too, will present major an-
titrust concerns. Finally, limitations on access to participation in
joint research or to the fruits of that research may present anti-
trust problems if the effect of those limitations is to create or
abuse market power in the hands of the joint venturers. Each of
the three kinds of effects will be considered in turn.14
Addressing "collateral restraints (non-patent)," DOJ conceded that
their "legality . . . is largely a function of the proximity of their
relationship to the essential purposes of the joint research venture, as
well as their not having excessive scope or duration.'1
Pertinence of NCRA §§ 2(b)(2) & (3) becomes apparent when
one reads that the Guide's examples of usually tolerated "closely re-
lated collateral restraints" include:
the obligation to exchange any results from research undertaken
previously in the field of the joint research, the duty not to dis-
close results of the joint research to outside parties until patents
are obtained, and the division of particular aspects of the re-
search between the venturers.""
To this degree, NCRA §§ 2(b)(2) & (3) are an authoritative re-
statement. The Guide recognized that such restraints are "generally
reasonably necessary" for conduct of joint research and ordinarily
would not have "significant anticompetitive impact".143 Agreements
to collaborate at a level more remote from "mere research efforts,
resulting in projects which closely approximate joint manufacturing
ventures or even mergers" were frowned upon. If such agreements
were "reasonably necessary," however, limitation "to the results of
the joint research," without encompassing "other competing prod-
ucts or services marketed by the cooperating firms," was commended
"unless these other joint activities can be justified on their own by a
separate joint venture analysis." 4" A stronger line was taken toward
any agreement "collateral to research undertaken by competing
firms that divides the market as to customers served or fixes prices
charged for products and services of the venturers" which was styled
"as a per se violation of the antitrust laws."1 45 Among the authori-
140. Id. at 5.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 5-6.
144. Id. at 6.
145. Id. at 6 n. 1.
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ties cited 146 was Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S. 47 Interestingly,
in 1985, DOJ announced a disposition to terminate the decree in
Timken.4 8 What did the Guide say of other restraints only slightly
related or unrelated to a joint research ventures' purposes?
An agreement by [venturers] to forego independent re-
search in competition with the joint venture may constitute an
unreasonable competitive restraint. The sharing of confidential
information about costs of production, or similar matters not
closely related to the research undertaken could also tend to
eliminate competition among joint venturers . . . . Similarly,
the pooling of confidential information, such as product intro-
duction dates, while questionable even on an ordinary research
joint venture, is especially suspect in a joint venture dealing with
externalities, for it can enable the venturers to prevent any of
their number from picking up the pace of innovation by making
available a product or process of which the other joint venturers
are unaware.
49
"Externalities" have to do with the environment and efforts to com-
ply with government standards regulating effluents and emissions.15
There is no concern in NCRA for the conspiracy theory of history
comparable to the Guide's projection of plots to retard controls
against environmental degradation.
At this point, it is appropriate to remark an important portion
of NCRA's legislative history:
The joint granting of licenses or the refusal to grant licenses
by participants in a joint R&D program is within the scope of
the Act - as are restrictions on such licenses reasonably required
to prevent misappropriation of proprietary information contrib-
uted by any participant or of the results of the program ....
Joint ventures in production and marketing are not, of course,
necessarily anticompetitive; indeed, they may have significant
procompetitive aspects. But this legislation is not directed to
these joint ventures. However, the sale or licensing of patents,
know-how, or other proprietary information that are developed
through a joint R&D program may constitute part of the pro-
gram. Obviously, marketing this intellectual property may be
the ultimate goal and a key financial aspect of a joint R&D
program and is rightfully viewed as an integral part of it ....
As used [in qualifications to what became the NCRA § 2(b)
146. 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951).
147. Department of Justice, released May 20, 1983. (Copy on file with the author.)
148. See supra note 137, at 6 (emphasis supplied).
149. Id. at 5.
150. S. REP. No. 427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 3112-3113 (emphasis supplied).
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exceptions] the term "reasonably required" denotes an objective
standard and thus does not refer to the subjective opinion of the
participants, but rather to whether the particular circumstances
at issue establish the need to exchange the type of information
in question and to do so in the planned manner. For example,
under this standard any exchange of information that results in
an agreement or that represents concerted action toward an
agreement to fix prices for goods or services would never be rea-
sonably required by a joint R&D program . . . .Few firms will
make significant contributions to joint R&D programs if they
cannot be assured that monetary support or technical know-how
that they contribute to the program will not be appropriated by
others and used outside the joint program against them. For ex-
ample, one participant in a joint R&D venture might convert
what is essentially the product of the joint R&D program to his
own exclusive use. Accordingly, the exclusion [to what became
NCRA § 2(b)(3)] makes proper allowance for covenants in joint
R&D programs that are reasonably required to protect the par-
ticipants' investments."'
These words addressed a precursor to NCRA § 2(b) but the ulti-
mate conference committee explicitly adopted them. 152
NCRA § 2(a)(6) obviously contemplates that the activities of a
defined joint venture, which acquires or achieves patent and other
proprietary positions, can include licensing not only third parties but
also the venturers themselves. This being the case, hasn't the venture
assumed such a personality per NCRA § 2(a)(6) that the venture
individually or, if the venturers have chosen to dispense with central-
ized management of a joint venture vehicle, the venturers collectively
can take advantage of the G.E. holding concerning hitherto unilater-
ally designed price-restricted licenses? Has not Line Material been
undone as conduct permitted the venture defined at NCRA §
2(a)(6), buttressed by the qualification within § 2(b)(2), is relegated
to the NCRA rule of reason?
Quite apart from the reader's answer to these not quite rhetori-
cal questions, is it not clear that NCRA - in the interest of maxi-
mizing return to the venture - rebuts any unfavorable pre-disposi-
tion of DOJ to allocating markets through field of use or geographic
restrictions, or both, imposed by defined ventures upon venturer-
licensees and their sub-licensees? The answers to these questions
seem entirely parallel to affording NCRA rule of reason analysis to
data exchanges among competitors collaborating in a mode contem-
151. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1044, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3132.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
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plated by NCRA § 2(b)(1). Maximizing these potencies presupposes
alertness of the venturers, when initially undertaking organization
and thereafter memorializing it, to formulating and to preserving
proper statements of purposes within the broad sweep of NCRA §
2(a)(6) as well as to explicitly relating activities within the qualifica-
tions to NCRA § 2(b) to serving the overall purposes. An operating
analogy to "cost justification" under the Robinson-Patman Act'5"
suggests itself. After-the-fact development of cost justification ratio-
nales are not effective. After-the-fact development of rationales con-
cerning application of qualifications to NCRA § 2(b) will not be any
more compelling.
Returning to the DOJ Guide as it relates to "collateral re-
straints (patent and know-how)," there was recognition that cross-
licensing of patents and exchange of know-how may be
particularly necessary, for instance, when a 'blocking' patent
that would prevent research or development is held by one of the
partners. It is not unreasonable under such circumstances to
limit the use of the contributed patents to that field at which the
research is directed if it is a clearly separate field of use. 54
This, of course, is consistent with the spirit of NCRA. But the Guide
went further, on the explicit level, by acknowledging that it is "nor-
mally permissible for the partners to agree to exchange all technical
information directly relevant to the success of the project gained by
their independent research efforts during the pendency of the ven-
ture."155 The Guide also advised that agreements "in licenses be-
tween the venturers such as ones obligating them not to undercut
each other's prices or not to solicit each other's customers are per se
antitrust violations.""' This is in accord with respected authorities1
57
but, if a joint venture defined at NCRA § 2(a)(6) can impose price
restrictions A la G.E. on licensees and the venturers themselves are
permissible licensees, it continues to seem that Line Material58 not
only is undone but is necessarily undone by the NCRA § 3 rule of
reason applicable to a defined venture.
Since NCRA § 2(a)(6) contemplates that venturers may estab-
lish "facilities for . . . prosecuting . . . applications for patents and
the granting of licenses for the results of such venture," it seems that
joint R&D venture vehicles so endowed with licensing power have
been equated with monoliths such as the licensor in G.E. to the ef-
153. See supra ANTITRUST GUIDE, note 137, at 6.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 United States 386 (1945); United
States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
157. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
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fect that such vehicles can negotiate price-restrictive licenses under
their own proprietary positions and, through sensibly-defined use re-
strictions and geographic allocations, effectively minimize competi-
tion among the venturers and others to the degree enjoyment of the
fruits of NCRA-blessed "cooperative research" are concerned.
5. Section 2 of the Sherman Act.-There seems little point to
developing considerable background concerning § 2 of the Sherman
Act. 159 It has not occasioned generation of per se theories. Acknowl-
edging that it is conceivable that activities of a joint venture defined
at NCRA § 2(a)(6) could become subject to attack as monopoliza-
tion, it is nevertheless appropriate to note that an anomalous effect
of NCRA § 3 is to visit its "rule of reason" upon prosecutors of
monopolization theories.
It would seem therefore, that the "presumptive illegality" sup-
posedly implicit iii deliberately amassing or defending a 70 % share
of an appropriately defined market'60 has gone by the boards in the
case of a venture within the definition at NCRA § 2(a)(6). It follows
that defined ventures are not to be judged by possession of monopoly
power alone for which reason U.S. v. Krasnow'6 ' and U.S. v. Na-
tional Lead Co.' are not entirely pertinent to NCRA § 3 prosecu-
tions. Even more affected is the rule implicit in Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. as it addressed exclusive and effectively
restraining patent pools in the absence of classic monopoly power."3
On the other hand, given relevance of the "specific intent" ele-
ment in attempts to monopolize'64 and all that is implicit in the
"overt act" element of conspiracies to monopolize, 65 it would not
appear that prosecutors of attempt or conspiracy to monopolize theo-
ries against defined ventures would be newly burdened since the rule
of reason as defined in Chicago Board 6 does not operate to shield
defendants possessed of anticompetitive ambitions and it seems that
NCRA § 3 has not changed those ground-rules.
C. Clayton Act Implications
The Clayton Antitrust Act both amended and supplemented the
Sherman Act. Enacted shortly after FTCA, the Clayton Act pro-
159. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United
States v. Utd. Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F.Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affid per curiam, 347 U.S.
521 (1954).
160. 143 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 335 U.S. 5 (1957).
161. 63 F. Supp. 513, 531-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
162. 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.8 (1969).
163. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
164. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
165. See supra text accompanying note 65.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 137-157.
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vided not only ordained substantive rules of decision but also pro-
vided civil remedies for violation of substantive rules embodied in the
Sherman Act and other statutes as well as the Clayton Act. The
treble damage action is one of the civil remedies. Principal substan-
tive thrusts of Clayton were at particularized species of commercial
conduct to the degree they presented a probability of injury to com-
petition. Later amendments not only altered substantive rules but
elaborated specialized industrial jurisdictions of various federal
agencies and prescribed certain reporting requirements. Alteration of
substantive rules included characterizations of certain conduct as un-
lawful even though there is no demonstrable potency for adverse ef-
fect on competition. Of the Clayton Act's substantive rules, this Part
III.C of the article treats only of §§ 2 (certain commercial discrimi-
nations and kick-backs), 3 (certain seller or lessor imposed restraints
on "customer"conduct), 7 (certain acquisitions) and 8 (certain inter-
locks) but not in that order.
In qualitative terms, of NCRA's principal impact on Clayton
Act norms relates to its § 7. Burdened by a popular mischaracter-
ization as an anti-merger statute, § 7 looks to acquisitions of not
only enterprises and interests in enterprises but also, more starkly,
assets. Not unduly limited by the techniques of acquisition, the stat-
ute can be applied to joint ventures just as it can be applied to merg-
ers and asset acquisitions. While one may infer that NCRA's impact
on § 7 is intentional and (given the legislative purpose of NCRA)
sensible, such inferences concerning §§ 2 and 7 are more difficult.
1. Section 7 of the Clayton Act.-Repeated references to the
DOJ Research Joint Venture Guide16 provide a basis for shifting to
preliminary consideration of structuring joint ventures within NCRA
§ 2(a)(6). Although it is crystal clear that § 7 of the Clayton Act
embraces joint ventures implemented by erection of incorporated or
limited partnership168 or Massachusetts trust vehicles in which ven-
turers receive equity participations in exchange for their investments
or pledges of investment, appropriateness of the niceties of § 7 analy-
ses to joint ventures analogous to general partnerships is far from
settled. The Guide noted that a "joint research project that is purely
contractual and involves no acquisition of any asset does not come
within the scope of section 7 but would be subject to Section 1 of the
Sherman Act." 69 This, of course, is so hedged as to constitute a
truism. Ignoring, for the moment, the fact that NCRA § 2(a)(6)
167. Note that the U.S. Dept. of Commerce has been promoting organization of R&D
limited partnerships. U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFORMATION, TECH-
NOLOGY R&D, CRITICAL TRENDS AND ISSUES 33 (1985).
168. See ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 137, at 3.
169. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
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almost cries out for implementation by creation of an incorporated
vehicle that in its turn can become a party to the master joint ven-
ture agreement, the language of § 7 of the Clayton Act 170 is curious
in terms of its applicability to general partnerships undertaking re-
search and development or any other business.
(a) Application of § 7 to joint ventures formed and operated as
general partnerships.-The Clayton Act defines "person" to include
corporations and associations "existing under or authorized by the
laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the territories,
the laws of any state, or the laws of any foreign country. 17 1 It is
arguable that an intentional general partnership1 72 is purely a crea-
ture of contract and thus does not exist "under or [as] authorized by
the laws of" a sovereign.1 73 Such a line of argument would have to
cope with popularity of the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) among
the states. The argument probably would note that the general pur--
pose and effect of UPA are merely to supply terms for internal gov-
ernment of partnerships to the extent partners have failed to be so
far-sighted7 4 and to protect creditors' rights.175 From this stand-
point, it can be seen that UPA is purely regulatory rather than es-
sentially enabling. However, general partners are inevitably persons
under the Clayton Act and it would seem that - in economics and
at law - acquisition of an equity participation in a general partner-
ship is also acquisition of an asset (in the senses of an absolute right
to fiduciary duties from each partner 76 and a contingent claim upon
the assets of each partner for the purposes of satisfying claims suc-
cessfully prosecuted by third parties under UPA §§ 13, 14 and 15)
for which reason even a joint venture d la general partnership may
be characterized as subject to § 7 of the Clayton Act.
Obviously, it is not essential in this article to resolve the ques-
tion of amenability of acquisitions of interests in general partner-
ships to § 7 of the Clayton Act. What is more remarkable about the
interface of § 7 and NCRA is the fact that § 7 condemns compre-
hended acquisitions when "in any line of commerce in any section of
the country, the effects of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. ' "' This "com-
petitive injury" standard may be applicable quite without reference
to the acquirer's purposes although, if demonstrably anticompetitive,
170. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1982).
171. As opposed to one deemed to exist by virtue of fact-findings under §§ 6(1) and 7 of
the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA).
172. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1982).
173. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 18-27, 6 U.L.A. 013-358 (Masters Edit. 1969).
174. Id. at §9 9-17, 40, 6 U.L.A. 133-212, 408-509 (Masters Edit. 1969).
175. Id. at § 21, 6 U.L.A. 258-84 (Masters Edit. 1969).
176. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
177. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
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they are relevant. Further, although this "competitive injury" stan-
dard looks to probabilities, courts (including the highest one) have
seemed to be somewhat fearful of the burdens implicit in qualitative
analysis 178 and quite willing to jump from statistics demonstrating a
lessening in the number of competitors or a trend toward concentra-
tion of market power to a qualitative conclusion. They did so in con-
texts of perceived accelerated trends to concentration and a belief
that Congress is in favor of a nation of small entrepreneurs."7 9 The
effect of such decisional processes was substitution of possibility of
injury to the competitive process for the probability of such in-
jury. 80 Although the Supreme Court belatedly signaled a willingness
for lower courts to entertain qualitative defenses 8' and the versions
of the so-called Merger Guidelines issued by DOJ during the Rea-
gan administration tend to pay more respect to qualitative considera-
tions than did the courts, unfortunate judicial precedents have not
been removed from the books and the Guidelines are neither law nor
even estopping on the government. 182
Embrace by NCRA § 3 of all federal antitrust laws 83 is most
significant. Those who would challenge either the organization of
venture defined at NCRA § 2(a)(6) or the later investment in it by a
new venturer would seem burdened by addressing not only the loose
competitive injury standards of § 7 of the Clayton Act but also stan-
dards explicit and implicit in the NCRA rule of reason. While Chi-
cago Board's rule of reason countenances consideration of probabili-
ties,'" it neither has been used to permit substitution of mere
possibilities for probabilities nor does it foreclose close attention to
defendant's purposes. No less can be said of NCRA § 3.
Applicability of § 7 of the Clayton Act to at least those joint
ventures employing an incorporated vehicle is a given. The effect of
NCRA §§ 2(a)(6) and 3, taken together, is such as to make it quite
unnecessary to belabor the question of whether § 7 reaches a joint
R&D venture formed and operated as a general partnerghip. NCRA
§ 3 explicitly embraces "antitrust laws" including § 7 of the Clayton
Act. Thus, it is the NCRA rule of reason rather than § 7 of the
Clayton Act and pertinent parts of the Sherman Act under which
178. Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 312-23 (1962) [hereinafter
Brown Shoe I].
179. Compare Brown Shoe I, supra note 170, at 343 with United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
180. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
181. Although, it cannot be gainsaid that the Guidelines may embarrass a plaintiff com-
plaining of an acquisition. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d
506 (3d Cir. 1969).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 45-52.
183. See supra text accompanying note 65.
184. See supra note 177.
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will be gauged competitive implications of combinations of persons
- whether or not otherwise competitors - in R&D joint ventures
defined at NCRA § 2(a)(6).
(b) § 7 and the competition concept.-What is the significance
of this displacement of the Clayton Act's § 7? Literature concerning
§ 7, and the philosophies said not only to underly it but to guide its
application, is legion. There can be little doubt that some successful
prosecutions under § 7 were of dubious social value.185 Although so-
called "Merger Guidelines" issued during the Reagan administration
demonstrate greater respect for competition as a qualitative concept
than is apparent in leading decisions prior to 1974,186 unfortunate
judicial precedent has not been erased by the Guidelines. They do
nothing save signal the line of thought pursued by those currently
entrusted with part of the enforcement power. When one addresses
formation of a long-term combination, reliance on the Guidelines is
reliance on the circumspection of prosecutors187 as yet unappointed
by regimes as yet unelected. Even so, private suitors have not en-
dorsed the Guidelines which purport only to guide enforcement deci-
sions by public officers.
While classic applications of § 7 have related to acquisitions in
the horizontal and vertical arrays, it also has been applied to so-
called conglomerate acquisitions. 88 Horizontal combinations are
subject to condemnation on showings that develop such a low order
of probability of injury to competition that it would be fairer to
speak of mere possibility.' 89 Analyses of vertical and conglomerate
acquisitions concentrate on a more substantial potential for foreclo-
sure of competitors from suppliers/customers and creation of undue
leverage over resources/outlets. Whether dealing with horizontal,
vertical, or conglomerate combinations, prosecutors under § 7 have
no need to show anticompetitive purposes of those acquiring or com-
bining. Congress' § 7 concern is for competition "in any line of com-
merce in any part of the country". Hence, given definition of a rele-
vant product or service market, there is significant potential for
artificially maximizing the combination's market share (and, there-
fore, its presumed threat to competition) by narrow definition of geo-
graphic zones of competition. 90
Precedent under § 7 reveals little explicit judicial attention to
the quality of competition, particularly in connection with horizontal
185. See supra note 180.
186. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943) (food & drug).
187. See, e.g., FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
188. See supra notes 177 and 179.
189. See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
190. See supra note 179.
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integration. In context of emphases on market share and other quan-
titative data including trends toward concentration, it often was
made to appear that the true § 7 measures of the vitality of competi-
tion are the numbers of competitors and relative market shares of
those who would survive the acquisition or other combination in
question. Thus, if there is a concentration of effective competitors on
a given level of the exploitation-refinement-distribution chain, or
even if there is a marked trend toward such a condition, precedent
indicates that the prosecution need prove only the likelihood that
acquisition of an actual or potential competitor will present a greater
risk that surviving major participants will have greater market
power. 19 1 Albeit unlabeled as such, such a showing amounts to pre-
sumptive illegality.
Congress' generic purpose in enacting substantive provisions of
the Clayton Act is said to have been to address, in their incipiency,
arrangements that might mature into Sherman Act violations. Judi-
cial concern for likelihood of a risk of greater power seems to look
to "incipient incipiencies" other than those reserved to FTC19 rather
than a true probability of injury to competition. Should the prosecu-
tion lack ability to sell a perception of industrial concentration or a
trend to it, prosecutors must be prepared to develop a probability of
injury to the competitive process that is considerably more certain
than the likelihood of a risk of greater market power becoming
available to the acquirer. Happily, in the mid-seventies, the Supreme
Court evoked more judicial care although it did so by crediting a
defensive showing that the quality of competition was unprejudiced
despite dramatically increased concentration in an arbitrarily defined
product market.' The Court has not had occasion to elaborate its
implicit appeal to realism.
While DOJ's Merger Guidelines have become more sensitive to
the concept that quantitative data have meaning only in terms of
qualitative effect, practitioners cannot lose sight of the facts that the
Guidelines neither estop public prosecutors nor have life necessarily
succeeding a given political administration. The latter consideration
is accentuated by precedent demonstrating that it is feasible to at-
tack an acquisition decades after the event. 9 Further, although the
Guidelines have potency to embarrass public prosecutors,' 95 they
191. Maher, Two Little Words and FTC Goes Local, 80 DiCK. L. REV. 193, 211 n.119
(1976), reprinted in 1 CORP. COUNS. ANN. 541, 561 (H. Friedman, J. O'Brien, & H.
Schlogam ed. 1977) (referring to the effect of FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321-22
(1966) [hereinafter Brown Shoe II]).
192. See supra note 180.
193. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
194. See supra note 181.
195. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
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lack that value vis-a-vis private plaintiffs under § 7.
NCRA § 3 has great significance in terms of avoiding the
sloppy precedent elaborating § 7 of the Clayton Act as well as the
addresses of §§ 1 and 2 to joint ventures. While DOJ merger, joint
research venture, and international operations guides are sympa-
thetic to joint R&D, they are neither law nor more than politically
transitory. NCRA § 3 is law which ordains that ventures defined by
NCRA § 2(a)(6) are to be tested by the NCRA rule of reason.
Those who object to either the fact or the progress of a venture de-
fined at NCRA § 2(a)(6) will be burdened to a degree significantly
greater than prosecutors entitled to invoke § 7 of the Clayton Act.
Indeed it seems that that the rigor of U.S. v. Columbia Steel Co.,'96
modified only by NCRA §3, will provide guidance for analyses of
the formation of joint R&D ventures.
The NCRA § 3 rule of reason implicitly includes venturers'
purposes among "relevant factors affecting competition" just as
surely as it includes all other "factors affecting competition" includ-
ing, most significantly, "effects on competition in properly defined
relevant research and development markets."' 97 Venturers' procom-
petitive purposes, and probable as well as actual procompetitive ef-
fects of their R&D venture, will be as susceptible of defensive use as
alleged anticompetitive purposes and potencies are of prosecutorial
significance. In this equation alone is a great difference from litiga-
tion conducted under § 7 of the Clayton Act. The magnitude of the
difference is accentuated when one recognizes that attack on the fact
or continued operation of an NCRA § 2(a)(6) venture must entail
proof inter alia of actual (presumably adverse) "effects on competi-
tion in . . . relevant research and development markets". Thus,
there is a significant displacement of the numbers game played
under § 7 of the Clayton Act, particularly when one focuses on joint
R&D by persons otherwise competitors.
2. Section 8 of the Clayton Act.-Assuming that a joint ven-
ture within the definition of NCRA § 2(a)(6) is implemented via an
incorporated venture vehicle, the strictures of § 8 of the Clayton Act
could come to bear rather quickly. It provides inter alia that
no person at the same time shall be a director in any two or
more corporations, any one of which has capital, surplus and
undivided profits aggregating more than $1,000,000, engaged in
whole or part in commerce, . . . if such corporations are or shall
have been theretofore, by virtue of their business and location of
operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by
196. See supra note 44.
197. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1982).
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agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of
theig'
Sherman Act, antitrust provisions of Wilson Tariff Act, and the
Clayton Act. 199 Obviously, one million dollars is a lot less now than
it was in 1914 but Congress has not seen fit to inflation-effect § 8.
Purely and simply, prosecutions of § 8 theories in connection with
interlocks between an incorporated joint venture vehicle and an in-
corporated venturer (pursuant to a venture defined at § 2(a)(6) of
NCRA) have been subjected to the NCRA § 3 rule of reason.
Section 8 of the Clayton Act aims principally at interlocking
directorates between or among incorporated competitors which are
in commerce. It does so by prohibiting individuals from serving as a
director of more than one corporation within certain classes of com-
peting enterprises. Prosecutions under § 8 are relatively rare.
Ignoring its address to banking institutions and certain common
carriers, the essential point of §8 is to prohibit individuals from si-
multaneous service as a director of two or more such corporations
engaged in commerce that are or have been competitors to a degree
that the corporations' agreed elimination of competition would vio-
late federal antitrust laws specified in the Clayton Act. There is no
explicit exception for interlocks between or among incorporated sub-
sidiaries of a common parent or parents. While the potential for
foreclosure of an insignificant amount of competition may be held de
minimus, the ban is not avoided by the fact that a substantial vol-
ume of competing sales is insignificant in context of the affected en-
terprises' total operations."'0
Subsuming the "in commerce" nexus, § 8 of the Clayton Act by
its own terms does not relate to a joint venture unless (i) two or
more of the venturers are incorporated, (ii) they organize an incor-
porated joint venture vehicle, and (iii) directors of the incorporated
venturers also serve as directors of the venture vehicle. On the face
of the matter, planning a joint venture can avoid § 8 difficulties with-
out much difficulty by merely dispensing with element (ii) or (iii).
However, if the venture is one defined at NCRA § 2(a)(b), it is a
given that § 8 of the Clayton Act is modified by NCRA § 3 with the
consequence that the little consideration to be given to implications
of interlocking boards will be in context of the NCRA "rule of
reason".
3. Section 2 of the Clayton Act.-Since § 2 of the Clayton
198. 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (1982).
199. United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
200. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a),(d)-(f) (1982).
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Act is concerned with price and other commercial discriminations,"0 '
it is not of interest peculiar to joint ventures. Assuming, however,
that test marketing is embraced within activities permitted a defined
venture, there is a real potency for NCRA § 3 to work unanticipated
magic on classic "Robinson-Patman" theorems.
Unlike §§ 3202 and 7203 of the Clayton Act, its §§ 2(c),(d) & (e)
lack "competitive injury" standards.20 4 Therefore, if the reader will
permit, they define statutory per se offenses. But, if a venture defined
by NCRA § 2(a)(b) accommodates test marketing of product by
paying "phony brokerage"2o 5 or affording disproportionate merchan-
dising supports to competing customers, 06 the NCRA rule of reason
is applicable!
§ 2(a) of the Clayton Act, the basic civil price discrimination
statute,10 is addressed to sellers of commodities. The statute has
three alternate competitive injury standards of which none deals di-
rectly with sellers' purposes. They look to probabilities of injury to
the competitive process occurring at the level of the discriminating
seller's competitors ("primary level"), at the level of a disfavored
customer itself competing with a favored customer ("secondary
level") and at the level of sub-customers ("tertiary" level"). While §
2(a) prosecutions alleging injury at the primary level tend to evoke
evidence of seller's anticompetitive purpose as germane to the
probability of injury,20 8 discrimination among competing cutomers
tends to speak for itself. 09 The NCRA § 3 rule of reason, by defini-
tion, will burden prosecutions of NCRA-defined ventures under §
2(a) of the Clayton Act. The same will be true of prosecutions under
§2(f)210 of NCRA-venturers as buyers who knowingly receive the
benefit of discriminations prohibited by § 2(a). NCRA will not ham-
per criminal prosecutions under § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act2 '
since it neither is one of the classic antitrust laws nor is character-
201. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
202. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
203. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(c)-(e) (1982).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982).
205. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d) & (e) (1982).
206. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982). Note that the penal portion of the Robinson-Patman Act
did not become part of the Clayton Act or otherwise come to constitute one of the antitrust
laws. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1982).
207. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
208. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
209. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1982).
210. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
211. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982). The purpose of § 3 is to minimize anticompetitive foreclo-
sure of outlets for commodities. Although money was held - long ago - not to constitute a
commodity for purposes of a § 3 tying analysis, United States v. Investors Diversified Serv.
Co., 105 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 1951), the Supreme Court later took pains to stress that
money is a commodity in a Sherman Act tying context when the stress was unnecessary. Fort-
ner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 509 (1969) [hereinafter Fortner I].
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ized as such for purposes of NCRA.
4. Section 3 of the Clayton Act.-Of greater import is § 3 of
the Clayton Act. Tying is but one of four marketing practices ad-
dressed by § 3 of the Clayton Act. Assuming the requisite
probability of injury to the competitive process, § 3 also condemns
marketer-imposed requirements contracting, exclusive dealing, and
granting of price concessions to secure benefitted customers' absten-
tion from using or dealing in goods of the conceding seller's
competitors..2 12
(a) Potential circumscription of § 3 of the Clayton Act via
NCRA § 3.-Like § 2 of the Clayton Act, § 3 is not peculiarly perti-
nent to joint ventures. However, it is arguable that NCRA § 3
presents potential for circumscribing application of § 3 of the Clay-
ton Act to marketing techniques used either by a venture defined at
NCRA § 2(a)(6) or, in certain circumstances, parties to such a ven-
ture. This potential arises from not only NCRA's rule of reason but
its encouragement per § 2(a)(6) to "granting of licenses for the re-
suits" produced by defined ventures linked to leave, set forth at
NCRA § 2(b)(2), for venturers to indulge "conduct restricting, re-
quiring or otherwise involving. . .production or marketing" so long
as it is limited to enjoyment "of proprietary information developed
through" the venture.
(b) Effect of NCRA rule of reason on per se application of the
Sherman Act.-The potential for circumscribing § 3 of the Clayton
Act via NCRA § 3 is not as dramatic as the effect of the NCRA
rule of reason on Sherman Act tying jurisprudence. Per se stigmati-
zation of tying, of course, is limited to § 1 of the Sherman Act. The
stigmatization has a curious history. Proceeding under § 3 of the
Clayton Act, prosecutors theoretically are required to demonstrate
some fairly substantial probability of anticompetitive effect.2 13 This
contrasts sharply with the burden implicit in prosecuting per se of-
fenses. Unlike Sherman Act violations, violations of § 3 of the Clay-
ton Act do not expose transgressors to penal consequences. Alone
among the four commercial practices addressed by §3, tying has
been stigmatized as also offensive per se to the Sherman Act. How-
ever, unlike the classic per se offenses but somewhat comparable to
concerted refusals to deal," 4 both purpose and power are relevant to
characterizing tying as offensive per se to § 1 of the Sherman Act.2" 5
Unlike § 3 of the Clayton Act, which condemns certain conduct of
212. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrave-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
213. See generally, L. SULLIVAN, supra note 72, at 229-65.
214. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
215. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
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sellers and lessors of commodities for use or resale within the
U.S.A.,21 6 the Sherman Act can be deployed not only against buyers,
lessees and licensees but also by reference to transactions in such as
realty, services and intellectual property2 17 without necessary refer-
ence to use or consumption in the U.S.A.
Dicta in Times-Picayane Publishing Co. v. U.S. taught that
[wihen the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market
for the 'tying' product, or if a substantial volume ...in the
'tied' product is restrained, a tying agreement violates the nar-
rower standards expressed in § 3 of the Clayton Act because
from either factor the requisite potential lessening of competi-
tion is inferred. And because for even a lawful monopolist it is
'unreasonable' per se, to foreclose competitors from any substan-
tial market, . . . tying ...is banned by § 1 of the Sherman
Act whenever both conditions are met.2 18
Enacting § 3 of the Clayton Act in 1914,219 Congress saw fit to bur-
den prosecutors with proving that "the effect of such lease, sale, or
contract for sale of such [proscribed] condition . . . may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce. ' 220 The point was to relieve prosecutors from the heav-
ier burdens then demanded of prosecutions under § 1 of the Sher-
man Act as they might be aimed at tying, exclusive dealing or re-
quirements contracting which then were thought of as tools suitable
to would-be monopolists. Only commodity marketers were exposed
to § 3 of the Clayton Act. Section 3 liberated prosecutions from nec-
essarily entailing proof of marketers' anticompetitive purposes or
their arrangements' inevitably anticompetitive effects. Obviously,
Congress did not feel impelled either to subject commodities market-
ers' tying, exclusive dealing and full requirements contracting to per
se characterizations or to ease prosecutors' burdens concerning such
practices indulged by marketers of other than commodities or to ease
prosecutors' burdens concerning such indulgences by demanding
customers.
Yet, in the 1958 Northern Pacific Ry. v. U.S. decision, the Su-
preme Court not only held tying by a dominant merchant to be of-
fensive per se to § 1 of the Sherman Act but so ordained in a context
in which a dominant real estate operator tied its rail carriage ser-
216. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (dominance of realty
used to tie patronage of rail carriage); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (ties
of copyrighted cinema productions).
217. 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953).
218. 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
219. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982). See also, Standard Fashion Co. v. Margrave-Hudson, 258
U.S. 346 (1922).
220. 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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vices. Writing for the majority, Justice Black not only repeated
respected theorems that "it is not material that the prices fixed or
the markets allocated were reasonable" but purported to relegate
"business necessity" to obloquy. 221 Thereafter, mandatory block-
booking of copyrighted cinema productions was condemned as tying
offensive per se to § 1 on the dubious thesis that a copyright is the
economic equivalent of a patent in terms of being a licit monopoly
itself constituting a dominant market position.222 Subsequently, dev-
olution of dominance over the tying item of commerce proceeded
from a "sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable restraint
on free competition in the tied product"223 to, in a case involving
promotion of prefabricated housing by provision of below-market de-
velopment loans, "some advantage not shared by [the tying
merchant's] competitors in the market for the tying" item of com-
merce.224 Thus, assuming that a "not inconsiderable amount of com-
merce" in the tied item of commerce is foreclosed from the tying
225 """omarketer's competitors, prosecution of tying under § 1 of the
Sherman Act became almost as easy as prosecution of commodity
ties under § 3 of the Clayton Act. Only recently has the Supreme
Court indicated that a successful Sherman Act prosecution must in-
clude proof of a coercive effect on the customer subjected to the
tie. 6 Such coercion is not necessarily part of the prosecutor's bur-
den under § 3 of the Clayton Act.
It is conceivable that a joint venture defined at NCRA §
2(a)(6) may make its prototypical equipment or licenses of its tech-
nology available only on condition that the buyer, lessee and/or li-
censee accept a tie geared to not only the venture's enjoyment of the
fruits of its R&D but also quality control (achievable, e.g., by use of
a proprietary catalyst). It may be less conceivable - in a pragmatic
context - that such a defined venture become a marketer of com-
modities on a scale compatible with use of the techniques condition-
ally condemned by § 3 of the Clayton Act. Yet, if the fruit of a joint
R&D effort is a process for producing commonly recognized product
via a more economic process, it well may be that testing product
equivalency by reference to a generic standard or testing com-
patability with customers' process machinery, or both, will demand
exclusive long-term supply contracts. Assuming that a defined ven-
221. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
222. See supra note 221 at 6.
223. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter Fortner II].
224. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); see also, Fortner I;
see supra note 212.
225. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
226. 83 CONG. REC. 546 (1938), reprinted in C. DUNN, WHEELER-LEA ACT, A STATE-
MENT OF ITS LEGISLATIVE RECORD 201 (1938) [hereinafter cited as C. DUNN].
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ture has produced a patented or unpatented proprietory process for
mass production of a commodity, it is equally conceivable that vali-
dation of process safety, process economics or product safety would
seem - to reasonable businesspersons - to dictate ties, appoint-
ments of exclusive dealers, and total requirements contracting or a
combination of them. Should any one or more of these business rea-
sons prove to be pertinent, NCRA § 3 should supplant not only
threat of a per se application of the Sherman Act but also the proba-
ble injury test of Clayton § 3.
D. Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) Implications
Irony attends consideration of NCRA's impact (or the lack
thereof) on FTCA. Endorsing the bill that ultimately became
FTCA, President Wilson observed that
Nothing hampers business like uncertainty, nothing daunts or
discourages it like the necessity to take chances, to run the risk
of falling under condemnation of the law before it can make
sure just what the law is.2"'
This sentiment is not unlike those underlying the enactment of
NCRA and, in 1982, ETCA.
As enacted in 1914, FTCA's principal thrust was at "unfair
methods of competition". 28 NCRA's definition of "antitrust laws"229
comprehends exactly that thrust of FTCA. However, the Wheeler-
Lea amendments of 1938 engrafted "unfair or decepetive acts or
practices" onto FTCA § 5's address to "unfair methods of competi-
tion". 30 By definition, NCRA does not include FTCA's concern
with "unfair . . .acts or practices" among the antitrust laws condi-
tionally subordinated to NCRA's rule of reason. The NCRA legisla-
tive history fails to expand on the rationale for distinguishing be-
tween FTCA's disjunctive addresses to "unfair methods of
competition" and "unfair . . .acts or practices". NCRA's definition
of "antitrust laws" is one of the few features of the Reagan Admin-
istration's proposed National Productivity & Innovation Act of 1983
that was unmodified in the ultimate 1984 enactment. 31
That FTC jurisdiction to condemn "unfair . . . acts or prac-
tices" is significant to virtually all exclusionary commercial under-
takings cannot be gainsaid since the Supreme Court's 1966 Brown
Shoe If and 1972 S&H decisions. The former commissioned FTC to
227. 38 Stat. 719 (1914).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1) (1984).
229. 52 Stat. 111 (1938). See generally, D. Unkovic, J. Maher & N. LaMont, Interna-
tional Opportunities and the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, A-31-34 (BNA 1934).
230. H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20(2) (1983).
231. See Brown Shoe II, supra note 192, at 321-22.
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condemn conflict with "the basic principles of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts even though such practices may not actually violate"
such statutes. 232 S&H held that FTC's prosecutorial and judicial
roles are triggered by "public values beyond simply those enshrined
in the letter or in the spirit of the antitrust laws."'233 Happily, viola-
tion of FTCA § 5(a)(1) does not expose the alleged transgressor to
private suitors. Prosecutions for engagement in "unfair methods of
competition" entail proof of "at least a tendency to injure respon-
dent's competitors."23 4 One of the purposes of the Wheeler-Lea
amendment to FTCA § 5(a)(1) was to remove this need for evidence
of the potential for injury to competitors of the respondent. " Brown
Shoe II and S&H speak to judicial respect for this purpose. The
decisions defer to FTC expertise and demand nothing remotely remi-
niscent of rule of reason analysis.
Although NCRA's legislative history is less than helpful to un-
derstanding why Congress chose to permit FTC to exert its "unfair
• . .acts or practices" jurisdiction over not only joint ventures de-
fined at NRCA § 2(a)(b) but also their activities, a key may be
provided by the legislative history for ETCA. The legislative history
betrays misconceptions that only FTC's "consumer protection" juris-
diction is summed up by "unfair deceptive acts or practices" whereas
the Commission's antitrust jurisdiction is implicit in "unfair methods
of competition". s2 Long before the Wheeler-Lea amendments, con-
sumer protection played a significant role in elaboration of "unfair
methods of competition".13 7 The Wheeler-Lea amendments to FTCA
§ 5(a)(1) did not spring solely from a need to add consumer protec-
tion to antitrust. S&H and Brown Shoe II were not "consumer pro-
tection" cases. Nevertheless, amendment of FTCA § 5(a) by ETCA
Title IV burdened only prosecution of "unfair methods of competi-
tion" cases2 88 and the COR made available under ETCA Title III
does not shield against FTC attacks on "unfair . ..acts or prac-
tices."239 Purely and simply, it seems that a conceptual error implicit
in ETCA has been brought forward - unthinkingly - into
NCRA's definition of the "antitrust laws" it affects. This NCRA
232. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972).
233. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647-49 (1931) [hereinafter Raladam I].
234. 80 CONG. REC. 6588 (1936), reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 226, at 77. Note
that, when conditionally providing for exemption of joint R&D by small businesses from anti-
trust laws and FTCA § 5(a)(1), Congress did not see fit to discriminate between "unfair meth-
ods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." 15 U.S.C. § 638(d)(3) (1982).
235. H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2493.
236. See Raladam I, supra note 233.
237. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3) (1982).
238. 15 U.S.C. § 4021(6) (1982).
239. F.T.C. has authority to promulgate "trade regulation rules" by reference to its ju-
risdiction over "unfair...acts or practices" 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (1982).
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anamoly is not confined to FTC jurisdiction but, as developed later,
also impacts at the state level.
Matter not how FTC jurisdiction over "unfair . . . acts and
practices" came to elude NCRA's net, it did so. Thus, the NCRA
rule of reason will not burden FTC if the political context changes
sufficiently to encourage Commission prosecutions under or elaborat-
ing Brown Shoe II and S&H. The authors submit that this is not
only unfortunate but, most probably, the product of insufficient re-
search on the part of those who sought to free defined R&D ven-
tures' activities from analyses (and condemnations) pursuant to any
standard other the NCRA rule of reason. Failure to immunize ven-
tures defined at NCRA § 2(a)(6) from FTC "unfair . . . acts or
practices" jurisdiction presents, of course, a trap for those who ig-
nore the likelihood that a now politically- constrained FTC is only a
sleeping giant in terms of not only prosecutorial but rule-making240
potencies. More than that, the failure sets another trap for those who
might think NCRA addresses all state statutory unfair competition
rules!
E. State Implications
While many federal antitrust statutes and much of FTC's juris-
diction reach conduct only affecting interstate or foreign commerce,
there is no generalized preemption of state ability to adopt and en-
force antitrust, unfair trade and comparable statutes. States' police
powers include ability to regulate intrastate commerce. The Supreme
Court respects state antitrust jurisdiction over local manifestations of
interstate commerce. 41
Many states have antitrust statutes replicating basic themes of
the Sherman Act.242 Some states have constitutional provisions con-
cerning monopolization. 43 Many states, without necessary reference
to whether they have antitrust laws, have unfair trade practice stat-
utes (a/k/a "little FTC Acts") 4 which tend to be far more particu-
larized than FTCA § 5(a)(1). Several states have "unfair sales acts"
or similar statutes dealing with price discrimination or sales below
cost.245
The nature of this article is such that it is impractical to remark
240. Standard Oil of Ky. v. Tenn., 217 U.S. 413, 422 (1910).
241. Compilation of state antitrust statutes, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) §§ 30,000-
35,530.10.
242. See, e.g., ALA. CONsT. art. IV, § 103; ARIZ. CONsT. art. 14, § 15; WYO. CONST. art.
1, § 30 and art. 10, § 8.
243. See supra note 235. See also R. FELLMOTH & T. PAPAGEORGE, A TREATISE ON
STATE ANTITRUST LAW AND ENFORCEMENT, [July-Dec.] 892 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) Supp. no. 1, at 20 (Dec. 7, 1978).
244. Id.
245. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4016(a) & 4021(b) (1982).
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state statutes and precedents at length. Yet, it must be acknowl-
edged that enforcement of state antitrust schemes by public authori-
ties - subject to notable, but few, exceptions - is not consistently
vigorous. Various state statutes seek to encourage private enforce-
ment by provision of treble damages. Earlier, it was noted that state
competition laws have not been subjected to general preemption.
ETCA presents a species of particularized preemption. Title III of
ETCA contemplates that conduct described in a COR is shielded
against public or private enforcement of "any state antitrust or un-
fair competition law".24 NCRA presents another species of particu-
larized preemption but its address to state law differs from ETCA.
ETCA Title III includes pertinent state laws within its defini-
tion of antitrust laws,24 7 NCRA does not do so. 248 Rather, NCRA §
3 subjects "any state law similar to the antitrust laws" defined in
NCRA to its rule of reason249 and, to the extent a defined venture
has availed itself of the notification procedure contemplated by
NCRA §6,250 NCRA § 4(c) limits recoveries under "any state law
providing damages for conduct similar to that forbidden by the anti-
trust laws" to actual damages.251 Some nice (and, some might ar-
gue, not-so-nice) distinctions are presented by NCRA's address to
the states.
NCRA's definition of "antitrust laws" calculatedly avoids em-
brace of FTCA's address to "unfair or deceptive acts or practices".
Therefore, state unfair trade practice statutes (to the extent they
avoid adoption of the "unfair methods of competition" legend) are
not similar to the "antitrust laws" defined in NCRA. Consequently,
standards guiding application of such state statutes are not pre-
empted by NCRA's rule of reason and, to the degree states afford
(or permit) greater than actual damages to those injured by conduct
violating state unfair trade practices acts, the limitation explicit in
NCRA § 4(c) is inapplicable. Whether these consequences were in-
tended by legislative and other sponsors of NCRA is not disclosed by
the legislative history. Such a purpose is unlikely. As noted earlier,2 52
NCRA's definition of "antitrust laws" is one of the few features of
the Administration's 1983 proposal that survived as NCRA was en-
acted. The authors suspect that the failures to preempt were unantic-
ipated, relating more to slovenly failure to consider what was in-
246. 15 U.S.C. § 4021(b) (1982).
247. 15 U.S.C. § 4301 (1984).
248. See supra text accompanying note 44.
249. 15 U.S.C. § 4305 (1984).
250. 15 U.S.C. § 4303 (1984).
251. See supra text accompanying note 230.
252. Note that other exemptive schemes have not discriminated between the major dis-
junctives of FTCA § 5(a)(1). See Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. § 2158(b) (1982), and
Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 638(d)(3) (1982).
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volved in ETCA's inclusion of only part of FTCA § 5(a)(1) when
the ETCA definition of federal "antitrust laws" was lifted for use in
what became NCRA 58
There is a possibility that NCRA's failures to preempt have sig-
nificances beyond state unfair trade practices statutes. Thus, surviv-
ing state "unfair sales acts" tend to have more in common with § 3
of the Robinson-Patman Act (which criminalized certain price dis-
criminations) 5 than they do with § 2(a) of the Clayton Act.2"5 Sec-
tion 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act is not one of the "antitrust
laws"2 5 as that term is defined by NCRA. Since state unfair sales
acts are of relatively little consequence in this day and age, they are
not developed herein save to note that it is quite arguable that they
are not "similar to. . .antitrust laws" addressed by either NCRA's
rule of reason or its limitation of liability.
In any event, those who organize a venture defined at NCRA §
2(a)(6) must consider potencies for its operations of not only FTC
rule-making and prosecutions concerning "unfair . . . acts or prac-
tices" but also at least state unfair trade practices statutes.
IV. NCRA Limitation of Liability
NCRA's three so-called "detrebling" provisions2 57 require more
of a joint R&D venture than does the NCRA rule of reason. They
provide, however, considerably more than detrebling. Whereas exis-
tence and activities of all joint ventures within NCRA § 2(a)(6) and
the qualifications to NCRA § 2(b) are entitled to analysis under
NCRA § 3, there is a social price attendant upon their achievement
of limitation of liability under NCRA § 4 in that affirmative acts are
exacted from qualified venturers desiring its protection. Notifications
conforming to standards in NCRA § 6 must be filed with DOJ and
FTC.258
Use of "qualified" signifies that limitation is not available to a
defendant if the challenged conduct is violative of a "decree or or-
der, entered after [October 11, 1984], in any case or proceeding
under" NCRA-defined federal antitrust laws or state analogues
"challenging such conduct as part of a joint research and develop-
ment venture."259 Note use of the indefinite article. Under NCRA §
4(e), disqualification from detrebling can occur although the prior
decree does not read on conduct intrinsic to the joint venture conduct
253. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1982).
254. Id.
255. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958).
256. 15 U.S.C. § 4303 (1984).
257. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4303 & 4305(a) (1984).
258. 15 U.S.C. § 4303(e) (1984) (emphasis supplied).
259. 15 U.S.C. § 4014(a)(2) (1984).
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latterly challenged.
If one assumes an official disposition carefully to monitor activi-
ties of ventures defined at NCRA § 2(a)(6), which the authors do
not, the point of this provision seems to be to allow every venture at
least one bite. The authors say "at least" since this disqualification
from NCRA § 4 safe harbors keys on existence of a "decree or or-
der" vice a judgment. Continuing to indulge the assumption of offi-
cial care arguendo, NCRA could be characterized as more rigorous
than ETCA Title III since a COR is not necessarily prejudiced by
losing any lawsuit other than a formal revocation.26 On the other
hand, under NCRA, only limitation of liability is prejudiced by a
prior decree. Applicability of the NCRA rule of reason is unabated
by a prior decree.
A. Invasion of State Sovereignty
Putting the preceding minor attainder aside, the three limitation
provisions seem, at a glance, to be fairly straightforward. They are
not. Impingement on state remedies proceeds well beyond detrebling.
Two of the three focus on claims asserted by persons"' and states2"'
under §§ 4 and 4c of the Clayton Act.263 The third looks to persons
proceeding under state laws "providing damages for conduct similar
to that forbidden by the [NCRA-defined] antitrust laws".264 While
NCRA §§ 4(a) & (b) are true to "detrebling" usages attending pas-
sage of NCRA (as they hold private parties and states proceeding
under §§ 4 and 4c of the Clayton Act to actual vice treble damages),
NCRA § 4(c) goes much further. It provides that a succesful plain-
tiff under a pertinent state law "shall not recover in excess of the
actual damages sustained. ' 265 This preempts state laws not only to
the extent they afford treble damages but also to the degree they
present a potency for recovery of punitive damage awards within
states' continuing evolution of discrete approaches to tort litigation.
Consequently, there has been a substantial invasion of states'
otherwise sovereign powers not only to legislate unfair competition
rules and remedies but to permit their courts of general and original
jurisdiction to evolve forms of relief appropriate to the torts before
them. The authors are not disposed to expatiate on either punitive
260. 15 U.S.C. § 4303(a) (1984).
261. 15 U.S.C. § 4303(b) (1984).
262. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 & 15c (1982).
263. 15 U.S.C. § 4303(c) (1984).
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 98-1044, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS. 3137 in which the "Conferees . ..emphasize that the
elimination of treble damages for agreements limited to joint research and development for
which notification has been provided is not to be regarded as a precedent for any further
elimination of treble damages."
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damages as available in state courts or appropriateness of federal
preclusion of punitive damages to acquit state policies. Proceeding
from committee reports,266 they infer that responsible legislators
were innocent of any intent to invade states' rights so deeply. How-
ever, the authors cannot resist confessing a certain wry amusement
concerning the speed with which NCRA's preemption of state-af-
forded punitive damages whisked through a Congress unable to
come to grips with years of agitation for federal enunciation of a
uniform products liability regime limiting inter alia availability of
punitive damages in the sense of avoiding only redundancy of such
awards.
B. The NCRA Disclosure Regime: The Price of Limited Liability
As noted, there is a price for limitation of liability under
NCRA § 4. The price is a new and curious manifestation of the
disclosure culture that should enchant fans of Joseph Heller ,and
George Orwell. The § 4 shields are prospective. They limit damages
for injurious conduct indulged - after effectiveness under NCRA §
6(a) of an initial "notification" and appropriate supplements thereto
processed on behalf of a defined venture - but only to the degree
such conduct "is within the scope of" the notification. 67 Conse-
quently, attention to NCRA § 6 is demanded. Potential plaintiffs
will not be charmed.
Venturers are not required to comply with NCRA's disclosure
regime."' Rather, those who would enjoy the benefits of prospective
damage control under NCRA § 4 are obliged to honor NCRA § 6 as
the price of § 4's relatively safe harbors.29 There is an unspoken
analogy to the process whereby patent monopolies are the reward for
disclosures of inventions. The analogy goes further. Just as those
who maintain trade secrets may prosper or suffer outside of the pat-
ent system, joint R&D venturers are the best judges of whether they
will need the shields of NCRA § 4 and whether the essentially self-
targeting disclosure price is worth the protection to be achieved. In
this connection, it deserves restatement that applicability to ventur-
ers defined at NCRA § 2(a)(6) of the NCRA § 3 rule of reason is
not contingent upon submitting to the NCRA § 6 disclosure regime.
The notification process relates only to limitation of damages.
266. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4303(a)(1), (b)(1) & (c)(1) (1984).
267. 15 U.S.C. § 4305(a) (1984).
268. 15 U.S.C. § 4303 (1984).
269. See supra note 267.
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1. Scope of Disclosure.-The point of the NCRA § 6 disclos-
ure regime is to provide early warnings of sorts to DOJ and FTC270
as well as, through notices in the Federal Register that describe "in
general terms the area of planned activity of" comprehended ven-
tures,27' advices of lesser quality to venturers' competitors and others
likely to be affected by conduct of filing ventures. However, it is to
the scope of the notification filed with DOJ and FTC that the § 4
shields are addressed 72 rather than to the scope of the Federal Reg-
ister notice. This presents problems for not only venturers desiring
NCRA §4 safe harbors but also, and far more significantly, for both
those excluded from but potentially prejudiced by a given venture
and those otherwise subject to its impositions. The patent analogy
breaks down very rapidly when one considers the quality of data po-
tentially available and unavailable to those outside the annointed
circle of a defined venture.
When they opt to file a notification, venturers must make a sec-
ond "judgment play" of sorts concerning organization and content of
the "notification". Warning that the § 4 protections are "based on
the contents of" notifications, DOJ and FTC have chosen to avoid
the role of SEC reviewers of registration statements but to accept
the rule of notice editors.2 "7 This is consistent with Congressional
recognition that notifications need not be all that informative.
A joint R&D venture need not specifically notify [DOJ]
and. . .FTC that it intends to engage in the activities described
in Section 2(a)(6) of the bill, provided that the venture supplies
[DOJ] and . . . FTC with the notification described in section
6(a). Thus, unless a venture has notified [DOJI and . . . FTC
to the contrary, any activity within the definitions of section
2(a)(6) is within the scope of any venture as to which notifica-
tion has been filed under Section 6(a). For example, unless the
venture has indicated otherwise, efforts to market the results of
the venture, such as through licensing, will automatically be
considered within the scope of a properly notified joint R&D
venture.2
7 4
However, NCRA § 6(a) is not so cavalier. It requires that a notifica-
tion disclose "the nature and objectives of the venture" as well as
identities of "parties to the venture".2 75 Thus, venture planners seem
270. 15 U.S.C. § 4305(b) (1984).
271. See supra note 266.
272. See U.S. Dept. of Justice statement of Dec. 11, 1984, reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) V 4513 in context of NCRA § 6(b) (15 U.S.C. § 4305(b) (1984)).
273. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1044, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3137.
274. 15 U.S.C. § 4305(a)(1) & (2) (1984).
275. 15 U.S.C. § 4305 (1984).
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to be faced with a problem not unlike that confronting draughtsper-
sons of corporate charters in jurisdictions lacking provision for an
abbreviated claim to all purposes and powers permitted by the law of
the incorporating jurisdiction. Will a judicial strict constructionist be
content with a notification that say only "the parties to this venture
intend jointly to undertake and conduct all of the activities particu-
larized at section 2(a)(6) of the National Cooperative Research Act
of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(6)" that the court will consider "the
nature and objectives of such venture" to have been communicated?
Those to be left in external darkness must recognize that it is
inevitable that one presenting a notification "on [the] venture's be-
half' 2 76 will draft the notice27 7 despite a statutory hint to the con-
trary and that "general terms" '278 published in the notice will not be
overly informative. The notification may not be much more informa-
tive unless the venturers wish to take advantage of the NCRA § 2(b)
qualifications or otherwise to guard against a judge who reads
NCRA § 6(a) rather than its legislative history. DOJ seems willing
to honor the history rather than to construe § 6(a) at all expan-
sively.2 79 Even were this not so, there is yet another rub for non-
governmental outsiders.
2. Arrival in NCRA §4 Safe Harbors.-Assuming effective-
ness of a "notification", the NCRA § 4 safe harbors are limited to
conduct within the scope of the notification. 80 However, plaintiff has
no right to examine the notification before commencing litigation281
and, even when it has commenced, discovery of federal resources is
limited! 82 NCRA § 6(d) provides against DOJ or FTC release of
any part of a filed notification except "the information published in"
the Federal Register.2 81 So much for the patent analogy. While the
venturers can decide whether or not to file a notification, they may
not have to be all that concerned with disclosure to the public. The
same is true of data developed by DOJ or FTC "in the course of any
investigation, administrative proceeding, or case, with respect to a
potential violation of the antitrust laws by" the venture concerning
which notification was filed.' Catch 22 seems too modest an acco-
lade for this ingenious deterrance to plaintiff's indulging complete
cost-benefit analyses before commencing treble-damage actions.
276. See supra note 266.
277. 15 U.S.C. § 4305(b) (1984).
278. See supra note 266.
279. See supra note 260.




284. 15 U.S.C. § 4305(a) (1984).
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(a) Membership changes and additional notification.-Earlier,
submission to the notification regime was referred to as the price of a
defined venture's achievement of limitation of liability. While the re-
gime commences with a filing "no later than 90 days after entering
into a written agreement to form" the venture, the regime is not
exhausted by the initial filing. Within ninety days after a "change in
its membership," a venture must notify DOJ and FTC of the
change. Parties to the venture are encouraged to file such additional
notifications as the parties deem appropriate "to extend the protec-
tions of" § 4.286
(b) Post-filing factors.-Mere filing of an appropriate notifica-
tion does not signal safe arrival in the NCRA § 4 safe harbors. Ac-
cording to NCRA § 6(b), either DOJ or FTC is to publish the Fed-
eral Register notice "not later than 30 days after receiving a
notification." Per administrative agreement, DOJ is the publisher. 86
Per the statute, a notification will be effective "to convey the protec-
tions of section 4 as of the earlier of" publication date or expiration
of thirty (30) days from the authorities' receipt of the notification. 87
DOJ and FTC solicit submission of a "draft Federal Register no-
tice" by the party filing the notification as well as "evidence" that
the filing party or "other persons" are authorized to review the (pre-
sumably redrafted) notice before publication. 88
(c) Recommendations regarding disclosures.-It is the authors'
thought that venture planners should not be encouraged by the legis-
lative history289 to indulge crypticisms and DOJ's receptivity to ven-
turers' exercising
their own discretion in determining the quantity and form of the
material required to describe the nature and objectives of their
venture. 9o
Rather, mindful of the potency of review by trial judges, the authors
suggest that notifications and modifications thereto should be drawn
in such manner as to inform a semi-sophisticated reader of not only
liberally-stated commercial parameters of the undertaking (advan-
tages to be taken of the NCRA § 2(b) qualifications) but aspects of
the contemplated operation that might be offensive to normal anti-
trust norms (e.g., interlocking boards of an incorporated joint ven-
ture vehicle and incorporated venturers). The phrase "semi-sophisti-
cated" is used to denote the authors' conviction that Congress did
285. See supra note 272.
286. 15 U.S.C. § 4305(b) (1984).
287. See supra note 272.
288. See supra text accompanying note 273.
289. See supra note 272.
290. In re Universal Camera Corp., 19 S.E.C. 648 (1945).
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not evoke a standard akin to the "average investor" supposedly ad-
dressed in prospectuses qualified under the federal Securities Act of
1933.91 Notifications under NCRA are not aimed at the public or
any segment of it. The official addressees, DOJ and FTC, must be
presumed to possess a certain legal and economic sophistication be-
yond the average investor. Trial judges, later to be called upon to
determine the "scope" of notifications, must be presumed to possess
the legal sophistication of the average lawyer.
NCRA affords DOJ and FTC power only to determine the
"general contents" of the Federal Register notice.292 Further, ade-
quacy of the notice is not germane to effectiveness of the notification
and achievement of the NCRA § 4 safe harbors. Whether the agen-
cies will strain to develop an "average competitor" standard for the
notices is doubtful. Publications through 1987 do not remove the
doubt. On a theoretical basis, DOJ and FTC are helpless to resist
effectiveness of a notification that informs them that an NCRA §
2(a)(b) venture will embark on missions or use techniques the au-
thorities would prefer not to see. "Theoretical" is stressed since, un-
like an ETCA Title III COR, 98 NCRA does not constrain DOJ
ability to use its investigative powers and, like ETCA, NCRA fails
to constrain FTC powers either to investigate or to promulgate rules
as to "unfair . . . acts or practices" or to prosecute such acts or
practices. Of course, prosecution of NCRA rule of reason theories
against ventures defined at NCRA § 2(a)(6) is permitted. Thus,
while there is a temptation to regard DOJ and FTC as paper tigers
when confronted with a plainly anticompetitive NCRA §6 notifica-
tion, the temptation should be resisted. Looking only to their investi-
gative powers, the agencies continue to have weapons to harass and
thereby to magnifiy venturers' overhead. Looking beyond agency in-
vestigatory powers, DOJ and FTC can prosecute. Even were this not
so, the prudent planner will not provide incentive for a judge trying a
damage action to discover that a species of conduct is beyond the
disclosed scope of the venture.
(d) Types of ventures seeking NCRA § 4 protections.-A read-
ing of notifications published in the Federal Register reveals the
types of ventures availing themselves of the protections under
NCRA § 4. Many entities appear to be organized as partnerships or
unincorporated associations2 " although there are entities formed as
291. 15 U.S.C. § 4305(b) (1984).
292. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(3) (1982).
293. In the first three years under the Act, only 13 ventures filing under the Act were
specifically listed as operating as an incorporated joint venture.
294. Examples of ventures incorporated as nonprofit corporations are Portland Cement
Association, 50 Fed. Reg. 5,015 (1985); Semiconductor Research Corp., 50 Fed. Reg. 4,281
(1985); Engine Manufacturers Association, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,956 (1986); and National Center
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both profit and nonprofit 95 corporations as well as limited partner-
ships." 6 As noted earlier, " 7 participants in many of the ventures
seeking the protections of the Act are foreign as opposed to domestic
companies. Other participants are foreign-owned or have significant
foreign ownership. Traditional industries such as automobiles,"'
steel, 99 cement,300 glass, 0 1 movies 02 and pharmaceuticals 03 are
represented as are high technology areas such as computers,30' semi-
conductors,30 5 and genetic engineering. 0 6 Some ventures have filed
at the point of entering into organizational discussions3 07  while
others seem to file only after agreement on long range30 8 or short
term projects.30 9 One trade association seems to file a separate notice
for each project undertaken although venture participants remain
constant. 10 Of parenthetical interest are filings by governmental
agencies.311
Congress often effects a trade-off of sorts when it enunciates a
for Manufacturing Sciences, 52 Fed. Reg. 8,375 (1987).
295. Examples of ventures formed as limited partnerships are Agrigenetics Corp., 50
Fed. Reg. 5,443 (1985) and Oncogen Limited Partnership, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,326 (1985).
296. See supra note 5.
297. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, 50 Fed.Reg.
5,444-5,450 (1985); Medium Range Truck Transmission Cooperative Project, 50 Fed. Reg.
4,928 (1985); Engine Manufacturers Association, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,956 (1986); Southwest Re-
search Institute, 51 Fed. Reg. 5,813 (1986); Wickes Manufacturing Company, 51 Fed. Reg.
25,620 (1986); Metal Casting Technology, Inc., 52 Fed. Reg. 10,420 (1987).
298. See Bethlehem Steel Co. and United States Steel Corp., 50 Fed. Reg. 4,281
(1985); Joint Venture to Conduct Research on the Continuous Casting of Sheet Steel, 51 Fed.
Reg. 21,426 (1986).
299. See Portland Cement Association, 50 Fed. Reg. 5,015 (1985).
300. See International Partners in Glass Research, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,175 (1985); Indus-
try-University Center for Glass Research, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,262 (1986); Corning Glass Works,
52 Fed. Reg. 26,580 (1987).
301. See CPW Technology, 52 Fed.Reg. 22,692 (1987).
302. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Hoffmann-LaRoche Inc. Joint Ven-
ture, 50 Fed. Reg. 7,006 (1985).
303. See Computer Aided Manufacturing-International, 50 Fed. Reg. 3,425 (1985);
Microelectronics and Computer Technology, 50 Fed. Reg. 2,633 (1985); Applied Information
Technologies Corp., 50 Fed. Reg. 41,232 (1985); Intel Corporation/Xicor Corporation, 50
Fed. Reg. 50,864 (1985); Industry/University Cooperative Research Center for Software En-
gineering, 52 Fed. Reg. 4,065 (1987).
304. See Semiconductor Research Corp., 50 Fed. Reg. 4,281 (1985).
305. See Agrigenitics Corp., 50 Fed. Reg. 5,443 (1985).
306. See Software Productivity Consortium, 50 Fed. Reg. 2,633 (1985); Smart House
Project, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,428 (1985); National Center for Manufacturing Sciences, 52 Fed.
Reg. 8,375 (1987); National Forest Products Association, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,786 (1987).
307. See Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corp., 50 Fed. Reg. 2,633 (1985);
Empire State Electric Research Corp., 50 Fed. Reg. 5,443 (1985); Applied Information Tech-
nologies Corp., 50 Fed. Reg. 41,232 (1985).
308. See Medium Range Truck Transmission Cooperative Project, 50 Fed. Reg. 4,928
(1985) [to end by 12/31/86]; Exxon Production Research Co. and Halliburton Services, 50
Fed. Reg. 2,632 (1985) [to end 12/31/85].
309. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, 50 Fed. Reg.
5,444-5,450 (1985).
310. See Adirondack Lakes Survey Corp., 50 Fed. Reg. 5,443 (1985); Empire State
Electric Engergy Research Corp., 50 Fed. Reg. 5,443 (1985); Computer Aided Manufactur-
ing-International, 50 Fed. Reg. 3,425 (1985).
311. 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(1) (1982).
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new policy. Thus, persons denied usual antitrust remedies by a COR
issued under ETCA may come to enjoy a specialized remedy af-
forded by its Title Ill.12 NCRA presents such a trade-off although
it makes the limited ETCA Title III cause of action seem very gen-
erous. NCRA § 4(d) provides that successful plaintiffs limited to ac-
tual damages by the section "shall be awarded" interest on their
damages "from the earliest date for which injury can be established"
until judgment date. Even this palliative is qualified. A court can
eliminate or modify an interest award if it finds that exaction of full
interest "is unjust in the circumstances." 1 '
V. NCRA & Attorney's Fees
SLike ETCA, 14 NCRA threatens losing private plaintiffs with
liability for defendants' attorney's fees. This threat, however, is not
as significant as it is in ETCA. NCRA § 5(a)(2) directs the court to
favor "a substantially prevailing" defendant with an award of "the
cost of suit . . ., including a reasonable attorney's fee, if the claim
or. . .claimant's conduct during [its] litigation . . . was frivolous,
unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith."3 15 NCRA §
5(a)(1) contemplates a similar award to a "substantially prevailing"
plaintiff.316 Both awards are subject to being offset to the extent that
the court finds the prevailing party burdened the litigation frivo-
lously, unreasonably, without foundation, or in bad faith. 1 7 The pro-
cess of awarding costs to successful defendants is not linked to exis-
tence or adequacy of a notification under NCRA § 6.
The Clayton Act contemplates award of attorney's fees only to
prevailing plaintiffs. 1 8 ETCA anticipated NCRA in its concern for
defendants but explicitly limited plaintiffs' exposure to situations in
which there is a finding that defendants did not violate standards
enunicated in ETCA.1 9 That NCRA is not so limited is obvious.
Yet, if one ignores the "Catch 22" implicit in compelling suit to dis-
cover the context of a notification,320 NCRA does not indicate dedi-
cation to punishing zealous "private attorneys-general." The ulti-
mate Conference Committee report makes much3"' of reliance upon
312. 15 U.S.C. § 4303 (1984).
313. 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(4) (1982).
314. 15 U.S.C. § 4304(a)(2) (1984).
315. 15 U.S.C. § 4304(a)(1) (1984).
316. 15 U.S.C. § 4304(b) (1984).
317. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
318. 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(4) (1982).
319. See supra text accompanying notes 280-282.
320. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1044, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3139-40.
321. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
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Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,23 a "Title VII" case which
validated awards of fees when plaintiff's claim was "frivolous, unrea-
sonable or without foundation". 2 ' More than that, the Conferees
stressed sympathy with later holdings of lower courts to the effect a
plaintiff is liable for defendant's costs including fees when plaintiff
continues to litigate after groundlessness of the essential claim be-
comes obvious.
VI. Organizing & Maintaining R&D Ventures
Prior to recommending approaches to organizing and thereafter
maintaining a venture qualified for maximum use of NCRA safe
harbors, certain elemental questions must be addressed.
What of activities undertaken by a venture, otherwise con-
forming to the definition in NCRA § 2(a)(6),32 4 that are beyond
those mentioned in the section? What of agreements between or
among venturers that are excluded by NCRA § 2(b) from the term
"joint research and development venture"? "
It is easy enough to say that such conduct is not entitled to
judicial application of the NCRA rule of reason. Very simply,
NCRA § 3 keys on conduct indulged "in or performing a contract to
carry out" an NCRA-defined venture and such a venture is recog-
nized by reference to activities permitted it.3 26 But such a response
ignores very real questions.
Does an otherwise conforming venture lose its character as one
defined by NCRA § 2(a)(6) when it engages in activities beyond the
scope of NCRA § 2(a)(6)? Will the answer vary by reference to
whether the ultra vires activity is anticompetitive? Whether or not
indulgence in ultra vires activities disqualifies venturers from NCRA
§ 2(a)(6), thereby debarring them from the NCRA §§ 3 and 4 safe
harbors, what is the effect of venturers' side agreements running
afoul of the exclusions spelled out by NCRA § 2(b)? What if there
are ten parties to a venture conforming to NCRA § 2(a)(6) and two
of them have a side agreement, unknown to the other eight, excluded
by NCRA § 2(b)? Is the joint venture so tainted as to be denied the
safe harbors of NCRA §§ 3 and 4?
Once again, the starting point is the statute.3 27 NCRA §
2(a)(6) equates the contemplated "venture" with "activities" under-
taken for enumerated purposes. There is no limitation against en-
gagement in activities beyond those coincident with purposes save as
322. Id. at 417.
323. See supra text accompanying note 29.
324. Id.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
326. See supra note 28.
327. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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presented by NCRA §2(b). 8 If Congress intended to limit permis-
sible activities of a defined venture to those particularized in NCRA
§ 2(a)(6), it would have been easy enough to accomplish. The
Webb-Pomerene Act provides an exemplar in its use of the word
"sole. '32 What Congress did, through its repeated use of "joint re-
search and development venture" as a defined term of art in NCRA
§§ 3, 4 and 5, was to bless activities serving identified purposes as
eligible prima facie for the safe harbors. Thus, activities serving pur-
poses within the particularizations of sub-parts (A) through and in-
cluding (D) of NCRA § 2(a)(6) and the qualifications to the sub-
parts of NCRA § 2(b) are eligible for the safe harbors whereas
other activities are remitted to usual antitrust analyses and reme-
dies. Any other construction would be insensible since, in effect, it
would hamper organization of an incorporated or unincorporated
joint venture vehicle as a cost and profit center (or being organized
as a series of such centers geared to discrete R&D goals) in order to
effect its own procurements, hiring, firing, and other entrepenurial
activities in a controlled fashion to serve the statutory purposes.
So, responding to the not too rhetorical questions posed some
paragraphs ago, activities of not only a defined venture but also the
venturers therein are subject to usual antitrust norms to the degree
such activities are clearly beyond the purposes of NCRA § 2(a)(6)
and the qualifications of NCRA § 2(b). Indulgences in such "ultra
vires" activities, even should they be subject to characterization as
anticompetitive or otherwise violative of antitrust laws or FTCA §
5(a)(1), do not deny NCRA safe harbors for activities either serving
purposes listed by NCRA § 2(a)(6) or within the qualifications to
NCRA § 2(b).
VII. A Word to Planners
This being the case, planners would do well to perform as com-
petent joint venture planners usually do, defining commercial objec-
tives and proceeding from there. Through discrete analyses of (a)
what can be done without prejudice to obtaining the benefit of the
NCRA rule of reason and (b) what must be done to achieve the two
safe harbors triggered by filing. After all, filing is not a price of the
NCRA rule of reason.
It would seem that, assuming neutrality of all other factors such
as securities regulation and tax implications, a venture vehicle pos-
sessed of the capacity of self-management always will be best to ac-
commodate day-to-day R&D management including licensing. This
328. 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1982).
329. See supra note 54.
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would be particularly true if the R&D involved procurement and/or
handling of volatiles. The same conclusion follows not only if there is
sensitivity to one venturer or another deriving unfair advantage but
also to the extent there is a perceived need to avoid the occasion of
the rawer manifestations of conduct addressed by NCRA § 2(b). A
distinct vehicle, preferably but not necessarily organized as a corpo-
ration, would be able to contract with suppliers and customers as
well as to guard itself and its property from unauthorized invasion
by venturers. It is quite conceivable that the master agreement be-
tween or among venturers would invoke the data exchange qualifica-
tion to NCRA § 2(b) in order to guard against individual venturers'
ability to abuse the relationship contemplated by NCRA § 2(a)(b).
The real world provides a sufficient history of suppliers, customers
and licensors' negotiating to achieve access to reciprocal's books for
the proper purpose of keeping the other fellow honest. Why should
data exchanges, designed to keep R&D joint venturers honest with
one another and society at large, be any different?
Earlier, it was recommended that the vehicle be made a party to
the base contract. This recommendation stands whether or not filing
appropriate to the safe harbors is to be made. It is also recom-
mended that counsel to R&D venturers and, ultimately, ventures,
examine state unfair practice laws and the FTCA § 5(a)(1) "unfair
• . . acts or practices" jurisdiction in context of the venturer's pur-
poses and implementation thereof. This sensitivity should extend
through licensing and test marketing. Failure, induced by what may
be only a passing enfeeblement of the agency, to consider the power
implicit in the FTC jurisdiction over "unfair" acts will not serve cli-
ents well if a later administration reinvigorates the Commission and
staffs it with folk disdainful of NCRA.
VIII. Conclusion
The starting point is the statute. In the case of NCRA, legisla-
tive history is more concealing than revealing. What has been
blessed is international, not merely national, cooperative research.
American entrepeneurs are not benefitted to a degree beyond non-
Americans. The number of filings with DOJ will not tell us anything
more than a minimum number of firms claiming full benefit of
NCRA. The NCRA rule of reason well may come, in the fullness of
time, to be invoked by non-filers. What benefits NCRA will endow
upon America's trading accounts will depend entirely on the sagacity
of American affiliates in multinational as well as domestic joint re-
search and development ventures.
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